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Abstract	  
 
 Often the UNHCR’s decisions contradict the mandate that it was created to uphold and 
fulfill. This thesis seeks to understand the reason the UNHCR makes these decisions. It examines 
various decisions the UNHCR made regarding the caseload of Rwandan refugees who fled after 
the Rwandan genocide and the resulting attacks into Rwanda. This includes three forced 
instances of repatriation from Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda. It then evaluates the motives behind 
the UNHCR’s decision to recommend that all Rwandan refugees from this caseload lose their 
status as refugees in June 2013. The field research component of this was carried out in Uganda 
in both Kampala and Kyaka II refugee settlement, where interviews of both refugees and key 
informants were conducted. The research also utilizes internal US government and UNHCR 
documents. The research found that the UNHCR makes decisions based on its need to survive as 
an organization. The need to survive involves three key components that influence the UNHCR’s 
decisions in different situations based on what needs are most pressing in each circumstance. The 
first component is the interests of donors, which the UNHCR must follow to continue receiving 
the funding necessary to operate as an organization. The second component is the priorities of 
host governments, which the UNHCR must follow because, to carry out its work, the UNHCR 
must have the trust and cooperation of the host governments willing to put land and resources 
towards the maintenance of refugee populations within their countries. The third component is 
the appearance of adhering to its mandate because otherwise the UNHCR loses its authority as 
an organization dedicated to helping refugees, which erodes its credibility and legitimacy. It is 
through these three components that UNHCR is able to continue to carry out its work and extend 
its tenure as a prominent humanitarian organization. This addresses a gap in the literature 
because it reaches an important middle ground between realism, which views humanitarian 
organizations as an extension of the priorities of donor governments, and humanitarianism, 
which views humanitarian organizations as institutions focused on promoting their mission 
autonomously. These findings are important not only to understanding the decisions the UNHCR 
makes but the decision-making of humanitarian organizations more generally. 
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 Rwandan refugees under the jurisdiction of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), who fled the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, are set to lose 
their status as refugees on June 30, 2013. This will close one of the most complicated refugee 
crises in history, but it will not resolve the challenges facing the thousands of refugees who stand 
to lose their status and access to refugee rights. Perhaps as importantly, the challenges that this 
case has and continues to pose to the very survival of the UNHCR as an organization remain 
under-addressed. This thesis aims to examine the motives underpinning UNHCR policy 
implementation, including the decision to invoke the cessation clause in the case of Rwandan 
refugees. While the paper will focus extensively on the decision mechanisms in this particular 
region, the findings will shed light on UNHCR decision-making more broadly. In short, what 
motivates UNHCR decisions? Is the organization guided primarily by its principles, or do 
political calculations shape the behavior of this “apolitical” organization? 
 Some would suggest that the UNHCR effectively operates as an apolitical organization 
that make all decisions based on the needs of refugees. Others claim that the UNHCR was 
created to carry out the political will of the states that founded it and continue to fund its 
operation. In this thesis, I argue that the UNHCR makes its decisions based on what it needs to 
do to survive as an organization. The choice then follows one of three components crucial to its 
survival. At times it makes decisions based on the interests of donors, at times based on the 
priorities of the host governments, and at times it makes its decisions based on how it will uphold 
its ability to carry out its mission to help refugees. 
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 To examine the UNHCR’s reasoning, I use a comparative case study involving three 
questionable forced repatriations of Rwandan refugees and the cessation clause that takes away 
Rwandan refugees’ rights to remain outside of their country. The three repatriations took place in 
Tanzania, Zaire, and Uganda. For research on the Ugandan repatriation and the cessation clause, 
research was conducted in Kampala, Uganda and Kyaka II refugee settlement, the settlement 
from which the refoulement to be examined occurred. I conducted interviews with refugees and 
officials, held a workshop with refugees, and obtained internal UNHCR documents regarding the 
cessation clause. I then completed an extensive literature review on the UNHCR, the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa, and UNHCR’s actions within the region, conducted interviews with three key 
informants, and obtained declassified United States state department documents to build the 
evidence section.  
 This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter explores the background of the 
UNHCR. The UNHCR section is divided into three parts. First, I explore the origins of the 
UNHCR and its expansion. The UNHCR was created with only a three-year mandate and a 
budget too small to accomplish much of what was in its mandate and designed to help only 
refugees from World War II. The UNHCR realized that the only way it could survive as an 
organization was to take expand its own mandate. It expanded its mandate by receiving funding 
from a foundation grant, deviating from the expected route of funding for a humanitarian 
organization. The UNHCR also expanded its mandate by handling post-World War II refugee 
crises in Hong Kong and then Tunisia, which paved the way for further work in refugee crises 
located outside of Europe, a change key to its survival as an organization when crises began 
decreasing in Europe and increasing in developing countries. The chapter then explores various 
pieces of legislation defining the UNHCR’s role. The section highlights key terms and concepts, 
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including the three durable solutions, protracted refugee situations, and the cessation clause. This 
chapter demonstrates how the UNHCR’s need for organizational survival influenced many of its 
early decisions and actions.  
 The next chapter includes a literature review of existing theories and my theory. First I 
review the history of humanitarian organizations, which began at the end of the Holocaust and 
upon the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Then I examine existing 
theories. Liberal and humanitarian theory claim humanitarian organizations make decisions 
based on what they believe will best suit the interests and benefit of the group or issue they are 
working to help. Realist theory, on the other hand, views humanitarian organizations as nothing 
but a representation of interests of their founders and donors, who make decisions for the 
organization. Constructivism, taking an approach more able to  believes humanitarian 
organizations make decisions based on modern conceptions of the purposes humanitarian 
organizations should serve and, instead of being affected by donor interests, are able to influence 
the priorities of donors. All three of these theories fail to take into account the ways in which 
decision-making must take several factors in account at the same time. My theory is that 
humanitarian organizations make decisions in carrying out their stated missions based on a core 
need to survive and expand. To do this, an organization works to establish its global legitimacy 
by showing it can uphold its mandate, raise the necessary funds from private and state donors, 
and win cooperation of countries where work is being carried out. My theory predicts that those 
are the three factors that the UNHCR considers as it decides how to carry out its stated mission. 
 The third chapter presents a background to the Rwandan genocide and aftermath. This 
will help create the context of UNHCR’s actions regarding repatriations of Rwandan refugees. 
First, there is a background to the Rwandan genocide, which explains both the growth of 
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hostilities between the Hutu and Tutsis and the influence of early refugee movements on the 
current situation in Rwanda, both of which are key to understanding refugee movements and 
repatriations today. I then explain the unfolding of the genocide and the Rwandan refugee 
outflow that started after the end of the genocide, which consisted primarily of Hutus fleeing the 
new government. I then give a background on the host countries and their relationship with 
refugees before and after the refugee situation presented. In Eastern Congo, refugees have 
influenced and changed local politics significantly, leading to further conflict and unending war 
in the region. In Tanzania, the government that once had an open and welcoming stance towards 
refugees changes its policies and expels the Rwandan refugees from Tanzania. In Uganda, the 
complex history of the Ugandan government, the Rwandan government, and Rwandan refugees 
in Uganda places Rwandan refugees in the position of being a political tool, both domestically 
and in its relations with Rwanda.  
 The fourth chapter contains evidence supporting my theory. I examine four comparative 
UNHCR actions regarding repatriation of refugees that were displaced shortly after the Rwandan 
genocide. First, I demonstrate that the UNHCR assisted in and encouraged the repatriation of 
Rwandan refugees from Zaire while the Rwandan government was attacking refugee camps 
because donors were willing to give financial and material assistance to repatriation efforts but 
not toward the maintenance of refugee camps. Second, I show that the UNHCR helped 
coordinate the forced repatriation of refugees from Tanzania because the Tanzanian government 
was determined to repatriate the refugees regardless of the UNHCR’s decision. Third, I 
demonstrate that the UNHCR did not participate in or prevent a refoulement in Uganda because 
participation would have jeopardized its legitimacy as an organization with a mandate to protect 
refugees. After comparing these three UNHCR decisions, I examine the UNHCR’s decision to 
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invoke the cessation clause because of a lack of willingness by donors or host governments to 
continue supporting the refugees. As a humanitarian organization, the UNHCR relies on host 
governments, donor governments, and its own reputation and legitimacy in order to survive as an 
organization. I demonstrate that the UNHCR makes decisions that allow it to persist as an 
organization because it is easy for the UNHCR to lost support in any of these three categories. 
 My final section is the conclusion. First, I summarize the findings of my thesis. Then, I 
explain the implications of this for the UNHCR, its constituents and, more broadly, 
humanitarianism. I will then explores potential areas for further study.  
 This project offers two important contributions. First, it includes original evidence that 
offers insight into the very refugee populations that are ultimately affected but under-examined 
and the ways in which the UNHCR’s decisions have affected the experience and security as 
refugees. Second, it stakes out theoretical ground between realism and humanitarianism when 
examining humanitarian organizations. It is able to identify that humanitarianism and realism 
both come into play at different points depending on the relevant survival needs. This new 
framework has the possibility of much broader relevance and use.  
 UNHCR is a complex organization with an important, complicated mission and many 
diverse pressures. The ways in which the UNHCR handles its decision-making under so many 
different pressures is instructive for understanding decision-making for other humanitarian 
organizations. Sometimes, the UNHCR makes decisions that strictly follow its mandate to help 
refugees. Sometimes, it will even defy its donors in order to preserve its guiding mission. Of 
greatest political interest, however, are the decisions it makes to diverge from its mandate 
because of its desire for political survival.  
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2. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – A Background 
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has managed to survive 
for over sixty years because it has made decisions based on organizational survival, even when 
they contradict its mandate. The UNHCR decides to deviate from its mandate often in both 
temporary and permanent manners in order to overcome obstacles and address changes over 
time. These changes over time, include different geographic necessities, types of conflict, and 
donor priorities and have forced the UNHCR to choose between making decisions based on its 
need to survive as an organization and making decisions solely based on the needs of refugees or 
the needs of donors. While the UNHCR was established as a humanitarian organization 
dedicated to helping refugees, its decisions cannot be based solely on the desire to help refugees 
because it also needs to endure as an organization. Thus the UNHCR makes its decisions based 
on this primary need to persist. 
 In this chapter I explore the background of the UNHCR. First, I give a brief history of the 
UNHCR, its inception, and major expansions in the UNHCR’s work that have allowed it to 
endure. Second, I explain key documents determining the UNHCR’s official mandate, including 
the 1950 statute founding the UNHCR, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Organization of African Unity 
Convention, and the “good offices” General Assembly resolutions. Third, I highlight the 
different resources and support the UNHCR relies on to continue its work. Finally, I discuss key 
terms and concepts regarding durable solutions for refugees, including repatriation, resettlement, 
and local integration. It also examines the concepts of protracted refugee situations, where no 
durable solutions are available, and the cessation clause. Throughout the chapter, it becomes 
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clear that the UNHCR has been created for political reasons and has had to continuously change 
its interpretation of it mandate and deviate from its mandate to survive as an organization.  
 
2.1 History of the UNHCR 
It is integral to understand that the UNHCR, like all international organizations and humanitarian 
organizations, is inherently unable to exist as an apolitical organization. This is because, as an 
organization, the UNHCR must base its decisions around its need to survive as an organization. 
To thoroughly comprehend this, it is important to understand the political origins of the 
UNHCR’s inception and early expansion. 
 The UNHCR was created in 1950. It was to be a temporary organization with minimal 
funding and a mandate lasting three years. Its objective was to either resettle or repatriate 
refugees still displaced from World War II, which remained a problem six years after the end of 
the war.  As an organization set up to have a short mandate and little power, the UNHCR was not 
expected to go on to become one of the most important international humanitarian organizations 
sixty years later.  
 Although the UNHCR was created with a mandate to only help refugees gaining their 
status on or before 1951, it was also created at the same time that the Korean War had begun and 
the Cold War began to intensify. Already there were refugee flows from the East to the West, 
and the United States and its allies quickly began to view these refugees as tools for the Cold 
War. The United States officially defined refugees as those fleeing communism and grouped 
refugee policy with national security.1 Because the United Nations (UN) is an international 
organization the US has limited control over, US officials did not want refugees to be dealt with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gibney, Mark. Global Refugee Crisis: Second Edition. ABC-CLIO; Santa Barbara. 2010. Pp. 90 
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primarily through a UN organization.2 The success of the UNHCR could lead to the creation of a 
new refugee commission, or expansion of the UNHCR, to also cover refugees fleeing 
communism. The United States denied the organization any direct funding  and even created its 
own refugee organization to compete with it. It also encouraged the United Nations to finance 
the UNHCR with only a small annual budget and ensured that the organization was a legal 
organization and not an operational organization.3 From the beginning, the UNHCR had to work 
to survive as an organization. Originally, UN members, following the encouragement of the US, 
gave the UNHCR a minimal annual budget of $300,000.4 The UNHCR was given only nominal 
funding so that it would not overstep state sovereignty. Under these circumstances, it was hard 
for the UNHCR to have much influence over states and their decisions regarding displaced 
people. However, the High Commissioner and his staff were determined to effectively carry out 
its mandate instead of becoming a hollow temporary organization unable to help the group it was 
created to benefit. 
From the beginning, the UNHCR had to find its own funding. The countries that created the 
UNHCR had mandated that it had little power or ability. The UNHCR found itself unable to gain 
sufficient funding while competing with and splitting with the many other human rights causes 
and organizations also needing funding for governmental donors after the 1948 Human Rights 
Declaration. Instead, they went to the private sector and secured a grant from the Ford 
Foundation for $2.9 million.5 With this money, they helped resettle refugees in Western Europe 
who were displaced both in World War II and the Cold War. From these early efforts, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Loescher, Gil. “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy,” International 
Migration Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, Special Issue: UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance 
(Spring, 2001), pp. 33-56 
3 Gibney, Mark. Global Refugee Crisis: Second Edition. ABC-CLIO; Santa Barbara. 2010. Pp. 90 
4 Loescher, Gil. Beyond Charity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.P. 57. 
5 Loescher, Gil. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
P. 66. 
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UNHCR began to gain the prominence from and the respect of many governments as an 
effective organization. From this early stage, the UNHCR began expanding its mandate and 
prominence in order to survive as an organization. 
The UNHCR’s first expansion outside of its original mandate involved the assistance to 
Hungarian refugees during the Hungarian civil war in 1956. In this expansion, the UNHCR went 
against its donors to expand its mandate. The UNHCR helped organize the repatriation of ten 
percent of Hungarian refugees from Western countries. Originally, Western countries resisted 
this because it would make communism look popular if people chose to return to the country. 
However, if the UNHCR did not help organize the repatriation, it would be seen as a Western 
organization and thus unable to gain the trust and respect of other regions and govenrnments. 
Therefore the UNHCR had to go against its donors in order to survive as an organization.  
 The UNHCR first expanded its mandate outside of Europe into developing countries 
when dealing with the Chinese refugee crisis in Hong Kong after the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. After some negotiation, the UNHCR was able to 
assist refugees in Hong Kong. This was the first use of the “good offices” as will be explained in 
2.3. 
 Soon after, the UNHCR expanded into Africa. In the first two decades of the UNHCR’s 
tenure, many African countries won their independence from European colonizers, which would 
lead to many refugee situations for the UNHCR. Many battles for independence were long and 
involved the exile of revolutionaries. One of the bloodiest and longest wars for independence 
took place in Algeria, where Algerians fought their French colonizers from1954 until 1962. As a 
result of the conflict, many Algerians fled, causing outpours into bordering countries. In 1957, 
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Tunisia requested the UNHCR’s assistance in dealing with refugees.6 The request by Tunisia was 
a challenge to the UNHCR’s survival. If it did not accept the request, the UNHCR would be 
known as an organization only responsible for European refugees and blind to other crises. On 
the other hand France, one of its key founders and donors, did not want the UNHCR to support 
the Algerian refugees fleeing the war with France because it would put on the crisis on an 
international scale and draw attention to the atrocities of the war. The UNHCR’s decision in 
either direction could have a lastin impact on its ability to survive as an organization. The 
UNHCR ultimately maneuvered diplomatically into playing a role in the crisis.  This marked the 
first time that the UNHCR intervened in Africa and truly expanded its mandate outside of 
Europe. 
 After this breakthrough, the UNHCR found itself handling more and more cases centered 
in Africa. As decolonization continued, new countries sought to establish themselves, and civil 
wars broke out over leadership often leading to mass refugee influxes. Similar conflicts in other 
parts of the Global South had analogous effects. Soon, the UNHCR found that the majority of its 
work took place in the Global South, as Western Europe became more peaceful and the iron 
curtain was firmly drawn.  
 Because of changing circumstances, the UNHCR found that they had quickly switched 
from being an organization based only in Europe to an organization operating most frequently in 
developing countries. This was because fewer conflicts occurred in Western European countries. 
Had the UNHCR not worked to expand its mandate to Asia and Africa early into its tenure, it 
would likely have ceased to maintain relevance. The UNHCR had to weigh the interests of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Loescher, Gil. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
P. 97. 
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donors, the interests of host countries, and the effects of their actions on their mandate in order to 
make decisions. 
 The next great challenge for the UNHCR was the end of the Cold War. The end of the 
Cold War is commonly considered one of the most significant turning points of modern world 
history.  At the end of the Cold War, refugees were no longer fleeing communism. This 
dramatically changed the purpose of the refugee regime for the West because these governments 
no longer saw refugees that were fleeing communism as ‘heroes’ choosing Western ideologies 
over Eastern ideologies. Because of this change and changing economic circumstances, 
developed countries began reevaluating its view of the UNHCR’s policies and priorities. The 
UNHCR often provides relief to mass movements of refugees, which is both crucial to the 
survival of the refugees and also functions as an easy fix to prevent the mass movements of 
refugees from reaching Europe or the US7. Many governments of developed countries have 
begun ignoring many rights of refugees set down in the 1951 Convention. Originally, the 
UNHCR served as an organization in charge of legal rights. As it became clear the UNHCR 
could not protect refugees without material assistance that allowed refugees to live, the UNHCR 
found itself in charge of both legal and material assistance. After the Cold War, in order to 
accommodate the changing attitudes of Western governments and their unwillingness to uphold 
the protection mandate, the UNHCR has slowly become an organization more and more focused 
on operational support instead of legal support8. This shift addresses needs such as food and 
shelter but at times does not necessarily provide refugees with the protection that the UNHCR is 
supposed to provide them. The emphasis on material aid allows the emphasis on protection to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Chimni, B S. "The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: a View from the South." Journal of Refugee Studies. 11.4 
(1998): 350-374. Print. 
8 Loescher, Gil. "The Unhcr and World Politics: State Interests Vs. Institutional Autonomy."International 
Migration Review. 35.1 (2001): 33-56. Print. 
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change so that protection is based on resources available to help refugees. This has had a 
dramatic impact on UNHCR’s decision-making because, when it runs out of resources to provide 
material assistance, the UNHCR often looks for durable solutions instead of continuing to 
emphasize the protection of the refugees9. These changes have been necessary so as to survive as 
an organization, as changing donor interests and further exclusion policies for immigrants to the 
US and Europe have meant that the UNHCR has to re-order itself to survive as an 
organization.1011 
 At its inception, the UNHCR faced time restraints, geographic restraints, and budget 
restraints that challenged its ability to carry out its mandate. Because of this, the UNHCR sought 
out its own funding and responded to emergencies outside of the region and the time period it 
was created to address. By understanding what was needed to become an established 
organization, the UNHCR gained global acceptance as a first responder for refugee situations. 
However, it also understood that the parameters under which it had to operate to survive would 
change over time, and the UNHCR has continuously changed its priorities and operations based 
on the wants and needs of the international community, with particular emphasis on its need to 
survive as an organization.  
2.2 The UNHCR’s Mandate – Key Legislation 
 The UNHCR was established through a 1950 statute passed by the UN General Asse,b;y 
but derives its overall mandate from the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and the subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which was an amendment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid. 
10	  The shift in European and American policies away from acceptance of refugees has high importance to the 
UNHCR and its mandate. Because of its complexity and variance by country, there is not the space to write 
about it here. However, it has been written about extensively elsewhere and it is incredibly important to 
understand the change in time. 
11 Widgren, Jonas. "Asylum Seekers in Europe in the Context of South-North Movements."International 
Migration Review. 23.3 (1989): 599-605. Print. 
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to the original convention. As is true of all United Nations conventions, states ratify conventions 
they agree to join and are then expected to write their own legislation implementing the 
convention within their country, as the United Nations has no real power over sovereign states. 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU)12 also created its own legislation on refugees, 
tailoring its definitions to the region’s specific needs and priorities. To survive as an 
organization, the UNHCR must follow the mandate set out by these protocols and definitions 
because they set out exactly what the UNHCR can do. However, the UNHCR often pushes the 
limits of its mandate and has often gone against what is written in its mandate, which can be 
expanded through “good offices,” from which the UN voted the UNHCR could expand its 
mandate for the benefit of groups not named under the original. Before examining the UNHCR 
policies and actions, it is important to understand the legislation that together makes up the 
mandate of the UNHCR. 
1951 Convention on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 
 The UNHCR was officially created in December of 1950 with a three-year mandate to 
help Europeans still displaced five years after the end of World War II. Seven months later, the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United Nations, giving 
the UNHCR a legal mandate and framework The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees recalls this part of the 1951 Convention defined a refugee as:  
“Some one who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion13.”  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is now the African Union (AU). However, because the literature was adopted when it was the OAU, I 
will continue using this to refer to it.  
13 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Ch. 1 Article 1A2.  28 July 1951, 
United Nations. 
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The 1951 Convention establishes the rights of refugees, such as freedom of movement, right to 
education, right to asylum, and many other rights.14 The Convention is based off of principles 
established in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was the first legal 
mandate to establish that people have certain basic rights that should be inalienable.  
Initially, because the UNHCR was originally created to deal with refugee issues in Europe and 
from World War II, the mandate also required that they met the conditions above because of 
events occurring before January 1,1951. Signatories were given a choice as to whether they’d 
prefer to only apply the mandate to include those displaced in Europe or also those displaced 
elsewhere.15 While the 1951 Convention was based on a specific group of people, the 1967 
protocol made this the first international mandate to be applied to all refugees instead of only to a 
specific group. 
 Under the United Nations, the UNHCR is governed by the United Nations General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). However, over time, the UNHCR 
has gained significant autonomy because of its expertise in the area of refugees and the way in 
which it raises its own funding. The executive committee of the UNHCR, responsible for 
approving the budget and expenditures, started out in 1958 with 25 member states and has grown 
to 85 members.16 Today, the UNHCR operates in 126 countries with a total of 7,685 staff 
members.17  
Of the 26 countries represented during the convention, none were from Asia or Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Today, many of the largest refugee populations are fleeing from and to Asian and African 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  At times, these rights end up advantaging the refugee population over the local population. For example, as 
cited in Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims Become Killers, Rwandan refugees in Uganda gained assistance 
and scholarships that ultimately made the refugee better educated than the children in host communities, leading 
to resentment. More recent UNHCR efforts have assisted host governments as well, decreasing the resentment.	  
15 Ch. 1 Article 1B. UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 
United Nations. 
16 UNHCR. “ExCom Members” UNHCR Website. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c89.html 
17 UNHCR. “Governance and Organization” UNHCR Website. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c80.html 
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countries not represented during the initial creation of the UNHCR’s mandate. Many of the 
European countries represented are now among the worst in terms of rejecting asylum seekers 
without allowing them to make a case for refuge, sending people back to their countries where 
they will face the danger and, in some cases, death they were fleeing. Therefore, many of the 
countries least represented at the inception of the UNHCR are those most affected by its 
existence and mandate whereas many of those represented willfully choose to disobey its 
mandate without facing repercussions. 
The “Good Offices” 
 Soon after the UNHCR began working with refugee operations, it became clear that its 
mandate did not allow the UNHCR to tackle most major refugee problems because of its time 
and location sensitive mandate during the 1950s and 1960s. Often the UN General Assembly 
would expand the UNHCR’s mandate to cover new locations and refugee problems by “good 
offices” resolutions, which would declare that the UNHCR could take care of refugees and 
persons of concern where it saw fit. Good offices were often used between 1951 and 1967 so that 
the UNHCR could work with refugees from crises other than World War II. It was also used to 
justify working with refugees in mass influxes as allowed for by the OAU Convention. Good 
office conventions were last used in 1973. After this, these expanded offices became the norm 
and so legal backing for exceptions was no longer deemed necessary. To begin its growth as an 
organization, the UNHCR had to go against its own mandate almost from inception.18 
The OAU Convention 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa was written in 1969, only a few years after most African states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Zieck, Marjoliene. UNHCR and Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees: A Legal Analysis. Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 1997. Pp 73-74. 
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achieved their independence.19 Because of the time period, African governments were mainly 
concerned with refugees in the context of exile for fighting foreign occupation. Because these 
refugees were different from the traditional definition of refugees, they were taking into 
consideration different types of wars and refugee flows, for which assessing the persecution of 
each individual would be more difficult. The OAU Convention thus broadens the definition of 
refugees to also apply to: 
“Every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.20” 
 
 This is an important addition because it acknowledges that a general war, and not only 
persecution on personal grounds, can prompt a person to flee his or her country. While only the 
OAU Convention includes this definition within its refugee convention, the UNHCR has adopted 
this definition universally under the concept of the “good offices.”  
 There are subsequently two ways people fleeing their countries can achieve refugee 
status. The first is as individual asylum seekers. Here the claims are processed on an individual 
basis, analyzing whether fears are well founded and fall under the 1951 UN Convention 
definition. The second is as part of a mass influx. The 1951 UN Convention does not have a 
provision for this, but as demonstrated the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the 
UNHCR do have methods for allowing temporary refuge for groups in this situation.  This often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The Organization of African Unity was created in an effort to unite Africa and promote decision-making 
separately from the old Colonial powers. The OAU’s decision to write its own legislation on refugees was in 
part as a way of setting their own standards, but still it was written to facilitate the work of the UNHCR. 
20 OAS, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 6-10 September 1969, 
OAS, Article 1 p. 2. 
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occurs when a large group of refugees flees a country and, due to the overwhelming number and 
the fact that the fear is clearly well founded, individual cases are not evaluated.21 
The UNHCR and its Unofficial Mandate 
 While the UNHCR’s official mandates are listed above, the UNHCR’s ability to continue 
operations is contingent on the enduring legitimacy and importance in the view of the 
international community. There are three main factors influencing the UNHCR’s lasting tenure 
including funding, permission to operate, and authority as a protectorate of refugees  While the 
UNHCR may continue to exist as an organization under the United Nations, it would be less 
effective or cease to hold any functional role if it fails to maintain these three factors. 
 For any humanitarian organization, donor funding is necessary to survive. Because no 
state has a financial obligation to help refugees, the UNHCR has no choice but to rely on donor 
funding. This can create a collective action problem where nobody feels obligated to donate 
money because refugee protection and assistance is viewed as a shared public good. As it has 
been doing since its inception, the UNHCR must convince donors to put money towards the 
protection of refugees. It does this through making general appeals for UNHCR funding and 
direct appeals for emerging refugee crises. Donors often give a certain amount to the UNHCR’s 
general fund and then will also earmark money for certain initiatives. This ensures that the 
donors’ priorities are met. While the UNHCR discourages earmarking, its reliance on donor 
funding forces the UNHCR to take earmarked funds.22 As a response, the UNHCR began 
reporting total contributions and total un-earmarked contributions of each country separately in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Stedman, Stephen J. “Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering,” Brookings 
Press. 2003 
22 Interview with Karen Abu Zayd, former Secretary to High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. Conducted 20 July 
2012. 
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its annual reports so as to reward states willing to give more generally.23 However, this has not 
stopped a general trend towards earmarking.  
 This thesis will focus on the interests of the United States when looking at the influence 
of donors because the United States is by far the UNHCR’s biggest donor. The United States was 
initially skeptical of the UNHCR but, after realizing the power working with an external 
humanitarian actor could have for policy, the US soon changed its attitude. While some other 
governments give funds to the UNHCR and assume the UNHCR will spend it as they see fit, the 
US slowly earmarked more and more of its funding until it started designating the exact 
appropriations for 100% of its funding to the UNHCR since 2005, displaying its desire that the 
UNHCR carry out its work based on state priorities and not necessary its own priorities. Later, 
the US would go on to fund the UNHCR at much higher rates. According to Karen Abuzayd, 
former North American coordinator for UNHCR, the UNHCR often resisted requests from the 
United States government that it felt went against its mandate.24 Other sources suggest this has 
often led the US government to instead work through the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM).25 To survive as an organization, the UNHCR often has to weigh such requests 
with other elements of the need to survive as an organization, such as continued legitimacy 
through its mandate, funding realities, and host government interests. 
 The second factor is that the UNHCR must maintain its permission to operate in refugee-
hosting countries. Because these countries signed the 1967 protocol, they have agreed to host 
refugees and follow the mandate. However, refugees can put geographic, material, and financial 
strain on host countries, most of which are developing countries already struggling to meet the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 UNHCR Annual Reports 1999-2011. 
24 AbuZayd, interview with.  
25 Hilhorst, D. and Jansen, B. J. (2010), Humanitarian Space as Arena: A Perspective on the Everyday Politics 
of Aid. Development and Change, 41: 1117–1139. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01673.x 
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needs of their populations. Often, the pressure on host governments is alleviated by burden-
sharing efforts26 by donor governments. Donor governments give financial and material 
assistance and also accept some of the most vulnerable refugees into their countries. However, 
host governments still carry the vast majority of the burden. They are expected to allocate land 
and personnel to staff decision-making regarding refugee statuses in their country. At times, 
refugees pose a security risk to its host country because they themselves become militarized or 
the government or individuals from their country of origin seek out refugees in their host 
country. Hosting refugees from a neighboring country also puts strain on the relationship 
between countries, as hosting refugees indicates a lack of faith in a government’s ability to 
protect its citizens.27 For many developing countries already struggling with stability and 
resources, hosting a refugee population can push the country to instability. Recently, many 
refugee situations have become protracted for decades, leaving the host country responsible for a 
prolonged period of time as donor interests fade. As has been listed, refugees put numerous 
strains on host governments, all of which cease to be a problem if host governments commit 
refoulement and forcefully expel refugees. While this goes against the UNHCR mandate to 
which host governments are signatories, there have been numerous incidences where 
refoulement, or forced repatriation, has taken place. When one country commits refoulement, it 
sends a signal to other host countries that they too could commit refoulement. If refoulement 
becomes too normalized, it will effectively override the UNHCR’s mandate because the UNHCR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The term “burden-sharing” is used frequently by the UNHCR to describe sharing responsibilities in caring 
for refugees. This term captures the common view that refugees are a “burden,” which many have declared to 
be a negative attitude in need of change. Recent initiatives have focused on trying to make refugees a 
productive part of their host societies. For now, it is this attitude that forces the UNHCR to work hard in 
convincing both donors and host governments to support refugees without clear reward. 
27	  When the definition of refugees was created, the word “persecuted” was used pointedly to create a stigma for 
the countries refugees were fleeing. This has had a lasting impact for the way governments perceive 
governments with fleeing refugees… 
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can no longer offer refugees any guaranteed protection. Therefore, the UNHCR must work with 
host governments and meet their needs to ensure continued cooperation in order to survive as an 
organization.28  
 The third factor the UNHCR must take into account as its appearance as an organization 
primarily concerned with protecting and aiding refugees. While the UNHCR has a mandate that 
sets up its work but it can deviate from, it still must continue to carry out its mission (or appear 
to) enough that they able to maintain the authority and legitimacy to continue to hold to thrive as 
an organization. Losing this authority and legitimacy leads to general deterioration of trust from 
both donors and host governments, even if those groups themselves encouraged the UNHCR to 
deviate from its mandate in certain situations. Although it may be able to neglect this role in the 
short term while trying to gain donor or host support, doing so consistently would lead the 
international community to question its dedication to its mission and thus its purpose for 
existing. At times, the UNHCR must make decisions that contradict donors and host 
governments in order to preserve its mission in the long term.  
 The UNHCR must fulfill all three of these components to hold its unofficial mandate to 
operate from the actors it relies on to survive and carry out its work. While two of these factors 
are not part of its official mandate to operate, they are equally important in the way it carries out 
its operations to the mandate itself. 
Conclusion 
The rights established in both the 1951 United Nations Convention and the 1969 OAU 
Convention were based around the political environment in existence at the time they were 
written. The 1951 Convention only applied to individuals and very directly stated the time period 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Often, initiatives aimed at refugees are extended to local populations so as to offset unequal distribution of 
aid and offer host communities incentives for hosting refugees. However, this only mitigates certain concerns 
about hosting refugees – it does not address issues of diplomacy and security, for example.	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and geographical location it was relevant to. The 1969 Convention was written in response to 
refugee flows from fighting colonialism and subsequently from decolonization. This is important 
because both were created based on the time at which they were written and not based on 
predicting future refugee crises.  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees thus faces an ongoing challenge. It must 
both stay within the confines of mandates created based on specific refugee situations (even if 
applied more universally) and stay relevant to changing refugee situations. If it fails to stay 
relevant, it will lose funding and cease to exist or at least cease to hold the important role it does 
today. This was true as early as the 1950s, when the UNHCR already had “good offices” to 
expand its mandate past the 1951 Convention. It is this constant challenge to stay relevant for 
organizational survival that often causes the UNHCR to overstep or contradict the mandate of its 
creation. 
2.3 Explanation of Important Concepts 
 Because refugee protection constitutes a legal mandate, the UNHCR had to establish its 
own definitions and procedures. These established concepts and procedures were originally set 
forward as the norms for actions and policies regarding refugees. However, because of its need 
for organizational survival, the UNHCR has changed many of its norms. This section will detail 
a number of concepts important to the UNHCR’s actions and policies towards refugees. It will 
focus on the three durable solutions available for refugees; repatriation, resettlement, and local 
integration. It will also discuss protracted refugee situations and the cessation clause.  
 The status of refugee is supposed to be a temporary state of being. The UNHCR thus lists 
three durable solutions for refugees; resettlement, repatriation and local integration. While these 
have consistently been the three solutions for refugees, their prominence and definitions have 
	   26	  
changed over time because of the UNHCR’s need for organizational survival. With regards to 
the three durable solutions, the UNHCR’s work is highly confined by donor priorities and the 
priorities of host governments, forcing it to go against its mandate in order to maintain support. 
Resettlement 
 Resettlement, the least frequent of durable solutions, is the movement of a refugee to a 
third country, meaning a country other than the country of origin or country of asylum. Refugees 
are generally only granted resettlement when able to prove that they will be harmed if they stay 
in their host country and so they therefore need to be moved elsewhere.  
Most frequently today, refugees are resettled to Europe, Oceania, or the United States and 
Canada.29 The UNHCR’s ability to resettle refugees is wholly based on the desire of a country to 
host them. This is because once a refugee is granted refuge in one country, they have asylum and 
that country becomes their protectorate. Because of the nature of most modern refugee flows, 
this means that refugees often go from a developing country of origin to a developing host 
country, meaning that developing countries have to deal with much more of the burden of 
refugees than developed countries. The idea behind resettlement has now become a model of 
“burden-sharing” in which developed nations should take in more refugees and finance refugee 
services the developing countries forced to host refugees cannot afford to provide. However, 
developed countries often do not want to take in refugees and there is no way to force them to do 
so. The UNHCR estimates that while 800,000 refugees have well-founded reasons for needing 
resettlement every year, there are only 80,000 slots available.30 This does not include other 
individuals who want to be resettled but are not considered to qualify under the UNHCR’s 
standards. In addition, politics are a large part of resettlement. Refugees chosen for resettlement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 “Resettlement” UNHCR Website. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html 
30 UNHCR “Frequently Asked Questions about Resettlement,” 2011. 
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are often chosen for political and pragmatic reasons; often they are either well educated and 
would contribute to the economy or are from a politically important country. For example, many 
Somalis have been resettled to the US. Some claim this is because of political interests – the US 
wants to build up future leaders for the nearly failed state so it is not a terrorist hub in the 
future.31 While the UNHCR would like to be able to send more refugees to be resettled, it cannot 
make this its main priority for funds and advocacy if it wishes to survive as an organization 
because it derives its funding from developed countries and would not want to lose the favor of 
the donor countries.  
Local Integration 
 The second durable solution is local integration, under which refugees become citizens or 
permanent residents of their host country. In terms of naturalization, the 1951 UN Convention 
states the following: 
“The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of 
refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to 
reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.32” 
 
 However, the UN and UNHCR have no authority or power to dictate citizenship laws in 
any country. Therefore, this serves only as a recommendation and not as a mandate.33 It is then 
the laws of the host country that dictate the actualization of local integration. Because many host 
governments are developing countries with limited resources, few governments choose to locally 
integrate refugees. Just as UNHCR chooses not to emphasize resettlement to donors because it 
may decrease their support, the UNHCR similarly does not push the hand of host governments 
regarding local integration because, to survive, the UNHCR needs host governments to continue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Singer, Audrey and Wilson, Jill, “Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America,” Brookings Institute. 
March 2007 
32 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations. 
33	  While technically nothing in the UNHCR mandate is legally bounding, the request that hosts give refugees 
citizenship would overstep national sovereignty much too far by rewriting who belongs to the country.  
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to accommodate new influxes of refugees without casting them away for fear of having to locally 
integrate them. 
Repatriation and Refoulement 
The third durable solution is repatriation, where refugees voluntarily return to their country of 
origin because of improved conditions. The word “voluntary” is an important part of repatriation 
as a durable solution. The UNHCR defines “voluntary” repatriation as taking place under the 
following conditions: 
• “Conditions have changed sufficiently in the country of origin to allow the return of 
the majority in safety and dignity. 
• The return must be lasting and sustainable. 
• The return must take place without forces pushing refugees to leave or barriers 
preventing return. 
• The return can take place under conditions of: 
o Legal safety – absence of discrimination, freedom from persecution. 
o Physical safety - freedom from attack, safe routes of return. 
o Material safety – a means of livelihood and access to basic services34.” 
The 1950 statute establishing the UNHCR names one of the commissioner’s jobs as promoting 
and assisting in voluntary repatriation35. In 1980, the UNHCR executive committee came to the 
conclusion that voluntary repatriation should be a key part of the UNHCR’s work and that they 
should help determine what is voluntary36. Because the 1969 OAU Convention was created in 
reaction to colonialism, it was written with the expectation that most refugees would want to 
return to the country they were exiled from, so the OAU Convention heavily emphasized 
repatriation. Today, repatriation is the most accentuated solution in every region and is often 
promoted as the only solution for most refugees.37 This shift in emphasis to repatriation has often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection. 1996. Geneva. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection. 1996. Geneva. 
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led the UNHCR to neglect its duty to protect refugees.38 In the evidence and data section, there 
will be an analysis of how repatriation no longer has an emphasis on being voluntary, and is now 
even carried out in ways that put refugees in danger, because of the UNHCR’s need to survive as 
an organization. 
When governments carry out refoulement,39 it is a violation of the rights of refugees. This is 
stated in the UNHCR’s mandate as: 
"No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.40" 
 
While this is a part of the mandate widely accepted by most governments, it has often been 
violated. This has become more common in recent years. As many Western governments now 
systematically detain and often repatriate individuals seeking asylum, many developing countries 
no longer feel obliged to protect refugees and there are no longer governments in a position to 
criticize these refoulements. Therefore the UNHCR must figure out how to simultaneously 
prevent further refoulements and maintain the trust of and legitimacy from host governments. If 
the UNHCR allows several refoulements to occur, its legitimacy and authority will be 
challenged.   
Protracted Refugee Situations 
When none of the three solutions are available, refugees are left in protracted refugee situations. 
Protracted refugee situations are settings in which refugees are forced to stay in a country of 
asylum as if in a state of limbo for an extended period of time. The UNHCR defines a situation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Takahashi, S. "The Unhcr Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: the Emphasis of Return Over 
Protection." International Journal of Refugee Law. 9.4 (1997): 593-612. Print. 
39	  A refoulement is the repatriation of refugees are carried out without the consent of the refugees being 
returned to their country of origin. While the definition pertains to host governments, in practice the UNHCR 
has itself practiced or helped in the practice of refoulement.	  
40 UNHCR mandate, article 33(1). 
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as protracted if refugees have been living in exile as refugees for more than five years. Until 
recently, the number had to be at least 25,000 refugees, but that was eliminated because it 
excluded many refugees. Today over two-thirds of refugees are in protracted situations which 
have become more common over time.41 Protracted refugee situations are one of the biggest 
concerns for the UNHCR because they require extended funding but, because they are no longer 
immediate crises, many Western governments stop earmarking funds or providing additional 
funding for such protracted situations42. Unfortunately, because of the changing nature of 
conflict and the increase in failed states or states under danger of failing, protracted situations 
have become more common, with many of the situations in conflict-ridden countries continuing 
to deteriorate.  
The Cessation Clause 
 Refugee status has never been meant to be permanent. This is why the UNHCR named 
three durable solutions- it is an acknowledgement of the fact that refugee status itself is not 
durable. The 1951 UN Convention states that refugee status will be removed in the situation that 
  
“He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized 
as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the 
country of his nationality.” 
  
The invocation of the cessation clause strips these former asylum seekers of all rights they were 
guaranteed as refugees. This means that the UNHCR and the host government no longer need to 
work to ensure that the refugees are able to have one of the three durable solutions available. 
Instead, the former refugee retains the status of an illegal immigrant, which puts him or her at 
risk for a number of vulnerabilities and risks such as detainment and forced repatriation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Refugee Studies Center. “Protracted Refugee Situations” University of Oxford. 
http://www.prsproject.org/protracted-refugee-situations/  
42 Interview with Karen Abu Zayd, former Secretary to High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. Conducted 20 July 
2012. 
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Governments hosting refugees are officially in charge of researching and declaring when 
conditions in the country of origin are safe enough for return. Once the host government believes 
this safety standard is met, it can declare the cessation of refugee status for the group previously 
guaranteed protection. However, in practice decisions regarding application of this generally fall 
under the jurisdiction of the UNHCR. If a state decides that conditions in the host country are 
safe enough to force refugees to return but the state does not have the agreement of the UNHCR, 
the return of refugees is often considered refoulement. However, because most governments see 
refugees as a burden, host governments have thus far always followed any guidelines for 
cessation deadlines put forward by the UNHCR. Because of this norm creation, the UNHCR’s 
cessation recommendations are generally taken by the international community as declaration. 
The UNHCR often goes as far as recommending a specific date and creating implementation 
plans with each host government.  In the case of Rwandan refugees, for example, international 
aid organizations and governments alike quickly interpreted the UNHCR’s recommendation for 
cessation as the final word43. The UNHCR’s decision to recommend the invocation of the 
cessation clause for Rwandan refugees will be examined further in the data and evidence section. 
Conclusion 
The UNHCR names three durable solutions for refugees. However, because of restraints in 
support, it emphasizes repatriation over the other two solutions. The UNHCR is often unable to 
move refugees that remain in danger within their country of asylum to a third country for safety 
because of a lack of willingness by Western countries to host refugees. This prevents UNHCR 
from fully carrying out its mandate for protection. Similarly, the UNHCR is unable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Most recently, Amnesty International has issued recommendations to governments hosting Rwandan 
refugees that it is still their decision whether or not to invoke the cessation clause and that they should first  do 
their own research. This is in response to the way in which it has become a norm to see host governments 
follow UNHCR recommendations. 
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successfully promote local integration because developing countries often do not have the 
resources or support to naturalize refugees Because of a lack of support from Western countries 
for local integration efforts. This leaves repatriation and, when that is not possible, protracted 
refugee situations. As will be examined later, this often leads the UNHCR to violate its own 
mandate of voluntary repatriation, at times leading to the endangerment of refugees. To survive 
financially as an organization, repatriating refugees allows the UNHCR to renew donor interest 
in a situation, have positive results to report, and maintain status as an effective organization.44 
Conclusion 
 This chapter examines the UNHCR from many different angles. First, we looked at the 
inception and history of the UNHCR, where it was made clear that the countries creating the 
UNHCR had political motivations for both its conception and its initial limited abilities. The 
UNHCR expanded because of its understanding of what was necessary to survive as an 
organization. Second, we examined the mandates dictating what the UNHCR was allowed to do, 
as well as the legal ways in which the UNHCR was able to surpass what was dictated in its 
mandate within its first decade of existence. We also saw the unofficial elements key to its 
mandate. The last section laid out the different possible solutions the UNHCR sees for refugees 
and the ways in which the funding and desires of developed countries dictate which of these 
solutions are emphasized. It also outlined the concept of protracted refugee situations, which are 
increasingly common because of restraints on other possible solutions, and the cessation clause, 
which revokes refugee status instead of finding a durable solution. This chapter explored how the 
UNHCR dealt with these concepts based on its need to survive as an organization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Crisp, J. (2001), Mind the Gap! UNHCR, Humanitarian Assistance and the Development Process. 
International Migration Review, 35: 168–191. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2001.tb00010.x 
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 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees needs to survive as an organization 
to carry out its mandate. This chapter has demonstrated how the UNHCR’s mandate and history 
is innately political. It has also demonstrated how the UNHCR’s motivation to survive as an 
organization is an underlying factor in the decisions it makes. Understanding the UNHCR’s 
decision-making is important because sometimes the UNHCR makes decisions that contradict its 
mandate and put refugees at increased risk. I will demonstrate that the UNHCR’s need to survive 
as an organization at times puts refugees at risk, which directly contradicts the UNHCR’s reason 
for survival and existence.  
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3. A Theory of Organizational Survival 
 For an examination of humanitarian organizations and decision-making, I chose the 
UNHCR for several reasons. First, the UNHCR has, over time, become one of the most 
prominent humanitarian organizations in the field.45 The mission of the UNHCR is to protect 
refugees. However, the term “refugees” had never held a specific and technical definition until 
the creation of the UNHCR.46 Previously, “refugee” did not have a set definition and so, while 
many individuals and governments noted the vulnerability and needs of refugees, being granted 
refugee status was not viewed as a determination granting individuals universal inalienable 
rights. This norm creation allows the UNHCR to carry out its work as the primary expert on 
refugees in the field of humanitarianism and international development. Because of this 
expertise, the UNHCR is considered to be one of the more autonomous humanitarian 
organizations. This expertise exceeds the knowledge and interest of donors on refugee affairs, 
which allows the UNHCR to make decisions more autonomously.47 The UNHCR is often cited 
as an important case study in papers evaluating the autonomy of humanitarian organizations. 
While the qualities listed above make the UNHCR stand out as a humanitarian organization, the 
decision-making mechanisms the UNHCR uses are the same as those of other humanitarian 
organizations. The UNHCR is thus being used as a specific case fitting into a larger theory about 
humanitarian organizations.  
 In this chapter I review existing literature on the decision-making of humanitarian 
organizations and then I put forward my own theory. First, I explore the history of humanitarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  For the purposes of this paper, an international humanitarian organization will be defined as any organization 
created to give humanitarian relief in a foreign country. While other potential definitions of “humanitarian” will 
be discussed later, for the purposes of this paper it will be defined as emergency relief given to people unable to 
help themselves with their most basic needs such as food, shelter, water, medicine, and protection from harm 
(such as conflict). 
46 Orchard, Phil. "Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Soft Law As a Norm-Generating 
Mechanism." Review of International Studies. 36.2 (2010): 281-303. Print. 
47 Barnett, Michael and Finnemore, Martha. “Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations” 
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organizations and their growth in power and quantity. Then, I summarize the existing theories 
about humanitarian organizations and the decisions they make. This will include humanitarian 
theory, realist theory, and constructivist theory, . Finally I introduce my theory that humanitarian 
organizations make decisions based on their need to survive.  
3.1 History of Humanitarian Organizations 
 The atrocities the Nazis committed during the Holocaust in Germany and its occupied 
territories during World War II led people across the world to advocate for the creation of 
mechanisms to prevent and ban such actions from ever happening again. It was only shortly after 
this that the United Nations was created in 1945 with, as written in the UN charter “the mission 
of promoting friendly relationships, peace and cooperation between nations.48” The member 
states of the United Nations quickly prioritized human rights. In 1948, UN several member states 
signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which became the foundation for the basic 
notion of human rights now recognized by much of the world. The content of what is included as 
basic human rights has always been controversial, especially as it has grown in scope. While 
some still interpret it to only include what is defined under the 1948 Declaration, the term 
“human rights” has been expanded to include many other rights,from rights for people with 
disabilities49 to the right to express one’s sexuality,50 the latter of which has raised much concern 
in a number of countries claiming homosexuality will harm their cultures and religions51. The 
right to asylum for refugees stems from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a solution 
to take care of people whose governments fail to protect those unalienable rights. Therefore to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 UN Charter 
49 United Nations Enable Website. http://www.un.org/disabilities/ 
50 “Historic Decision at the United Nations”. Human Rights Watch. 17 June 2011. 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/17/historic-decision-united-nations 
51	  This has been demonstrated as of recent in Uganda, which has gotten global attention when the parliament 
was consider a bill that gave the death penalty for homosexuality. The first time the bill was set forward, it was 
tabled because of the pressure of allies and donors. However, it has been set forward again. 
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understand the UNHCR and humanitarian organizations more broadly, it is first important to 
understand the origin of human rights and its significance. 
   Human rights are becoming more universally recognized, but are rooted in Western 
principles and shaped largely by Western countries. The concept of human rights is innately 
Western52 in its focus on the ideal of individualism. Many other cultures instead focus on 
communalism and each person’s place within society. This clash of cultures arises in most 
discussions of human rights.53 A good example is the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. Though it seeks to prevent gender 
discrimination., many countries complain it undermines their cultures by requiring  a re-ordering 
of hierarchy and gender roles.54  But those countries, especially the ones dependent on aid 
from the West, felt pressured into signing the convention.55 Ironically, the United States refused 
to sign the convention, saying it might usurp  its own sovereignty.56  Though often critical of 
Western style humanitarianism, other countries view human rights by the type of right. There is 
general consensus, for example, that all people deserve food, water, shelter and protection in 
emergency situations over which they have no control. In the context of the UNHCR’s work, 
however, there is disagreement   over who deserves to be granted refugee status and basic 
necessities, as will be discussed further in the evidence and data section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 After the International Criminal Court put out a warrant for the arrest of Al-Bashir, the leader of Sudan, for 
organizing a genocide, many states in the African Union claimed that this was invading the rights of a leader to 
sovereignty over his state based on Western ideals of human rights. 
53 Holtmaat, Rikki & Naber, Jonekke, Women's Human Rights and Culture: From Deadlock to Dialogue 
(Intersentia 2011). 
54 Ibawoh, Bonny. “Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural 
Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 2000), pp. 
838-860	  
55	  Landman, Todd. "Measuring the international human rights regime." 97th annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, San Francisco, August. 2001. AND Moya, Dambisa Dead Aid	  
56	  Fattahi, Kambiz. “Women’s bill ‘unites’ Iran and Us,” BBC 31 July 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6922749.stm 
	   37	  
            Several humanitarian institutions emerged from this concept of human rights. The first 
major international humanitarian organization was the International Center of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), founded in 1863 (says its website). It is widely considered the model of how a 
humanitarian organization can operate in almost any setting while maintaining a reputation for 
neutrality.57 After World War II, the United Nations, and some countries and private donors, also 
created several organizations with written mandates to take care of basic human rights. However 
over time the type of human rights violations and the situations where they occur have changed 
extensively. As a result, many organizations have changed or have periodically deviated from 
what their original mandates required. This work sets out to address the reasons humanitarian 
organizations make decisions that contradict their own mandates. 
3.2 Existing Theories 
 An extensive literature exists on the creation and mandates of humanitarian 
organizations, but institutional change and divergence from mandates is a newly emerging area 
of study. As humanitarian organizations become more prominent, understanding their decision-
making processes and level of autonomy becomes key to understanding international relations 
and global governance today. The decisions of humanitarian institutions can be examined not 
only through theories of humanitarianism but also through broader theories of international 
organizations. This section will discuss literature on international humanitarian organizations and 
determine existing gaps. First, it examines liberalist and humanitarian theory, which employs 
only a humanitarian and ideological viewpoint. Then, it examines realist theory, which views 
international institutions as vehicles for the agendas of states or donors. Finally, it examines 
constructivism, which argues international organizations constantly change as they learn more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Interview with AbuZayd, Karen and Interview with Gambino, Tony.	  
	   38	  
and understand more about humanitarian effectiveness or organizational effectiveness in the 
world. Each of these theories makes an important contribution, but they present oontradictory 
views of how humanitarian organizations operate and, taken singly, each one fails to identify 
humanitarian actors’ primary overarching motivation. The theory I set forward synthesizes the 
core of these three theories and stipulates that humanitarian organizations make decisions 
primarily so as to ensure their continued survival.  
Liberalism and Humanitarianism  
 Liberalist theory believes progress is possible through cooperation and that this 
collaboration is the key to future peace and thus the alleviation of suffering. Rooted in the 
Enlightenment, it sees this cooperation as creating not only economic networks and political 
relationships that ensure peace but also a culture and mindset that leads to peace. Modern idealist 
/ liberalist theory stems from Immanuel Kant, who first argued that, while human violence and 
war may be a part of human nature, international governance and law could lead to lasting peace. 
Liberalism became a popular ideology between World War I and World War II, during which 
Woodrow Wilson and others attempted to create the League of Nations as an international 
organization that would monitor international relations. In his fourteen point plan, Woodrow 
Wilson outlined a plan that would promote peace between countries and allow for justice for all 
and not only the victors, which had never been done before. Although this was not implemented, 
Wilson’s ideas and principles became a new ideology of equality that fell in line with 
humanitarianism.58 And while the League of Nations failed, Wilson’s ideas made way for the 
United Nations and the growth of humanitarian organizations focused on human rights and 
peace. In the mid 1950s, Claude Levi-Strauss, an anthropologist, sought to emphasize the 
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  Seymour, Charles. "Woodrow Wilson in Perspective." Foreign Affairs. 34.2 (1956): 175-186. Print. 
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universality of humanity without ethnocentricity.59 This view of shared humanity came at a time 
when many colonies were fighting for independence and humanitarian and human rights 
organizations were gaining prominence. His work helped create an anthropological and 
philosophical way of viewing humanitarianism and helped it gain an even wider appeal60.  
 Humanitarianism is the ideological application of liberalism in emergency settings. 
Humanitarian aid61 is rooted in international cooperation and shared values as humanitarian aid 
comes from Western donors, including governments and private donors, who liberalists would 
argue may not directly benefit from giving such aid.62 Humanitarianism thus extends the notion 
of cooperation for peace into the provision of basic needs for those endangered by war or other 
disaster settings. The debates within the humanitarian perspective revolve around making 
choices about changes based on what would be best for populations in need. There is an ongoing 
debate within humanitarianism over whether the changes humanitarian organizations make 
should take on a political nature or should remain as neutral as possible. Remaining neutral 
would emphasize the liberalist transcendence of borders and politics. On the other hand, taking 
on a political nature would promote Kant’s notions of sustainable peace by using cooperation in 
international systems to prevent and condemn atrocities. 
 This debate has gained momentum because, while traditionally humanitarianism and 
development have been separated,63 more recently there has been discussion that perhaps they 
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  Hénaff, Marcel. Claude Lévi-Strauss and the Making of Structural Anthropology. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998. Print. 
60	  Barnett, Michael N. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University 
Press, P. 36. 2011. Print. 
61	  Humanitarian aid is defined as emergency relief given to people unable to help themselves with their most 
basic needs such as food, shelter and water61.  	  
62	  Generally, the concept of humanitarianism is applied to aid given across borders as opposed to aid given by 
internal actors of the country where the disaster has occurred.	  
63	  In the field of international development studies, there is a traditional distinction between humanitarian aid 
and development aid. Humanitarian aid focuses on meeting immediate relief needs, as mentioned before. 
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cannot be easily separated.64 There has been an increase in the number of failed and failing 
states, protracted armed conflicts, and ongoing crises after natural disasters. The protracted 
nature of these situations leaves many reliant on humanitarian aid unless there is an effort to 
incorporate development concepts into their treatment. However, humanitarian aid was 
traditionally defined by neutrality and impartiality, while development often addresses more 
political matters. This has opened an ongoing debate as to whether humanitarian aid should 
involve politics or not. The key takeaway from this argument is that the discussion excludes the 
possibility that humanitarian organizations’ choices are innately tied to more than just their 
beliefs, including funding restraints and the need for legitimacy. Under this view, humanitarian 
organizations have extensive autonomy.  
 According to humanitarian theory, humanitarian organizations should and usually do 
make their own decisions and are not reliant on external actors. This view allows for change over 
time and assumes that change will occur. However, it fails to see that not everything 
humanitarian organizations do is based on helping populations in need. While it takes into 
account funding restraints, it sees these as forced compromises as opposed to one of a few 
factors that are a part of the need to survive as an organization.  It would be a mistake to believe 
that humanitarian organizations could be divorced from those principles governing international 
organizations more generally. 
Realism 
Stemming from a Machiavellian view of political motivations, E.H. Carr defined classical realist 
theory through his critique of liberalist or “idealist” theory for naively failing to take into account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Development, on the other hand, focuses on longer-term, sustainable development. The idea behind 
development is that, after an initial period of immediate relief, it is more important that people can become self-
reliant instead of relying on outside sources.	  
64 Etxeberria, Xabier “The Ethical Framework of Humanitarian Action.” Reflections on Humanitarian Action; 
Principles, Ethics and Contradictions, 2001.  
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the importance of state survival and competition in all international relations. Hans Morgenthau 
similarly believed that all governments based their foreign policies in terms of increasing power, 
which he attributes to human nature65. Kenneth Waltz built on Morgenthau’s theories to create a 
sub-theory of structural-realism, in which he argues that international politics are still founded on 
power (though generally power in terms of security and not in terms of authority).66 However, 
instead of accrediting this dynamic to human nature, he attributes it to the anarchic nature of 
international politics. In the context of international organizations, Waltz’s theories would 
indicate that international organizations should never be considered serious political actors 
because states would never truly cede to such a supranational power and thus the international 
organization would have no ability to act independently.67 Regardless of the perceived root of 
international relations, realist theorists concur in the view that international organizations have 
little or no autonomy over their decisions.68 As is true of traditional international relations theory, 
realism uses a statist perspective.69 International organizations are simply institutions created so 
that states and donors can advance their priorities. It views any deviations from the mandate of 
an organization as self-interested choices the states and donors believe should be made. Donor 
desires are derived not from the true desire to help those in need or uphold human rights but to 
advance the interests of the state. Because international organizations rely on states for both 
funding and legitimacy, under realist theory they have little autonomy or ability to make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Morgenthau, Hans “Six Principles of Political Realism” International Politics: Enduring Concepts and 
Contemporary Issues. 
66 Waltz, Kenneth “Globalization and Governance,” International Politics: Enduring Concepts and 
Contemporary Issues. 
67 Abbott, Kenneth W, and Duncan Snidal. "Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 42.1 (1998): 3-32. Print. 
68 Barnett, Michael and Finnemore, Martha. Rules for the World. 
69	  The statist perspective has been considered the center of (Western) international relations since the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia Treaties defined the notion of a nation-state. However, the growth of terrorist organizations 
across state boundaries and ethnic conflicts stemming from illegitimate boundaries in Africa, the primacy of the 
state is slowly being questioned even outside of discussing regarding international organizations. 
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decisions. Realist theory also takes power dynamics within international relations into 
consideration. Should one actor or state be donating much more than others or have more 
international power over other states, that government makes the majority of decisions. For 
example, the United States donates more than twice as much as any other donor state to the 
UNHCR and has considerable power within the United Nations. Because of this, realist theory 
would state that the United States makes the majority of decisions for the UNHCR to carry out. 
 Realism addresses the political nature of the inception of humanitarian organizations in a 
way humanitarian theory does not. It also takes into account the funding constraints of 
humanitarian organizations. When considering the actions of humanitarian organizations, 
understanding funding is crucial to understanding decisions. However, reliance on donors and 
donor decisions do not encompass the entirety of decision making in a humanitarian 
organization. Realism falls short in its view that humanitarian organizations do not have their 
own autonomy. Thinking otherwise is similar to only looking at the organization as it was at its 
inception without understanding changes and deviations over time. 
Constructivism 
 As a response to realism’s assumption of anarchy in international political order, an 
emerging set of scholars developed the theory of constructivism in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Constructivism is a theory based on the notion that change occurs over time and involves 
the construction and general evolution of ideas and organizations. Alexander Wendt, a key 
constructivist theorist, set forward the idea that, while the international system may be inherently 
anarchic, the emerging international system plays a role not only in how states interact in 
international relations but also how international relations help form the interests and identities 
of states. He also argues, that while states may remain the main actors in international politics, 
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the increase of transnationalist identity and organization has been under-examined and cannot 
continue to be ignored in international relations theory.70 Two of the founders of constructivist 
thought, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore have written in conjunction extensively about 
constructivism and international organizations. Finnemore and Barnett view international 
organizations as autonomous actors that become established over time and quickly separate 
themselves from the dominance of donors. While Barnett and Finnemore, like realist theorists, 
focus on the interaction between donors and the organization as being an important part of 
decision-making,71 they believe knowledge and influence flow both to and from international 
organizations. Barnett and Finnemore base this on the constructivist nature of the mission and 
decisions of international organizations. They focus on the way in which international 
organizations create and define the paradigms for their own actions and mandate. Humanitarian 
organizations are the ones to decide who to help, in what ways, and when.72 Constructivist 
theorists view the creation of humanitarian and international organizations as a way states try to 
help rationalize management of the world in its complexity. Constructivists believe humanitarian 
institutions are in constant flux, as they are constantly expanding their knowledge. This is most 
in line with humanitarian theory in its view that changes are not for personal gain but improved 
knowledge on the subject area in discussion. Under this theory, the UNHCR’s primary reason for 
changes and deviations would be the evolution of knowledge for both the UNHCR and donors.  
 Constructivism also adds to the theory set forth in this paper. In this theory, humanitarian 
organizations not only change to appease donors but also help donors change to better 
understand the issue area in which the organization is an expert. It is also key to understand that 
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knowledge changes over time. However, constructivism focuses on change as being primarily 
knowledge based. It does not take into consideration many of the realities humanitarian 
organizations face in terms of needing to survive as organizations through funding and 
legitimacy. 
Problems and Gaps in Existing Theory 
 It is key to understand the ideas presented above to understand organizational change 
within a humanitarian organization. However, each theory is incomplete. Liberalism and 
humanitarianism grasp the importance of a mission to the organization and people’s desire to 
truly help the population they serve. This theory states that the decisions of humanitarian 
organizations originate autonomously and fails to include the importance of donors in the 
decision making process. Realist theory views  donors as the actors that motivate the change in 
humanitarian organizations, but it fails to observe the growing autonomy of these organizations. 
Constructivism begins to address and embrace the complexity that many of the other theories 
simplify, including constant change over time and that the relationship between donors and 
humanitarian organizations allows both to create change in the other. However, constructivist 
theory views the majority of change over time as stemming from the desire to change to better fit 
the mandate and its purpose in a changing world. It fails to consider the change as reliant on 
factors such as donor funding and the necessity for mandate deviance when an organization no 
longer has as many clients to help. These theories vary in their views of the roles of donors, the 
autonomy of international organizations, and the goals of international organizations without 
taking into account the legitimacy of parts of other theories. There is no mainstream 
comprehensive theory on change in humanitarian organizations that takes into account 
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simultaneously the significance of a humanitarian mandate, the reliance on donors, and the level 
of organizational autonomy of humanitarian organizations. 
3.3 The Theory of Organizational Survival 
 International humanitarian organizations are motivated by the desire to survive as 
organizations. Many existing theories do, in fact, highlight the need of organizations to survive. 
Realism assumes that international organizations are only able to be the extension of their 
donors’ interests because of their inherent need for financing and legitimacy from founders and 
donors. In The Empire of Humanity, even constructivist Michael Barnett notes the importance of 
funding for the continued existence of humanitarian organizations.73 However, the theory I put 
forward reaches past the well-known fact that funds are necessary for an organization’s 
endurance. I theorize that the UNHCR’s need to survive extends past simply donor funding, and 
that there are many complex factor the UNHCR must deal with in order to extend its tenure. 
Their reasons for wanting to survive are complex and spread across the other theories examined. 
There are individual motivations, such as the continuation of a career, the prevention of failure, 
or the creation of a legacy and an institution too important to fail. However, it also stems from a 
commitment and passion for the cause the humanitarian organization is responsible for. Those 
involved in a humanitarian organizations care about its survival because they believe in their 
mandate – if they cease to exist or play an important role in international relations, the people or 
issues they are responsible for will lose the support, funding, and importance the humanitarian 
organization was designed to create and uphold. For human rights based organizations, this may 
mean the rights they were created to uphold would no longer be enforced. For humanitarian 
organizations, this could mean the needs of those in dire situations would not be met, leading to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 It is important to not that he sees fundraising as a part of the work of humanitarian organizations, not an 
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the suffering and death of many. It is with these views and understandings that humanitarian 
organizations take seriously the importance of their survival and legitimacy. There are three key 
parts of this survival; donor funding, permission to operate in host governments, and legitimacy 
and authority to carry out its mission. Because of the nature of humanitarian organizations, they 
are reliant on donor funding for all operational costs. To operate, humanitarian organizations 
must have the permission of governments to work within their borders. Humanitarian 
organizations also must fulfill and adhere to their central mission in order maintain legitimacy.  
 Should this theory hold true, one would expect to see three main implications. While the 
institution will have to take all three into consideration during decision-making, it will likely 
follow the one most important to its survival at that time. First, humanitarian organizations will 
cater to funders. Second, they will follow the priorities and decisions of host governments. Third, 
they will make decision in adherence to their mission.  
 The first expected implication is that humanitarian organizations make decisions based 
on the desires of donors. This stems from the realist perspective on international organizations, 
as they are created by and funded by external actors. Because of this, the decisions of the 
organization are based on funding. Going against donor priorities could prevent an organization 
from carrying out the alternative it chooses to donor priorities. It also could lead to a decrease or 
removal of future funding, which could prove a threat to survival. Without funding, the 
institution is unable to operate. However, donor governments do not have strong interests in and 
preferences about all refugee situations. Generally, the humanitarian institution has been 
delegated to make many of these decisions based on their mandate. The other hypotheses may 
also be more important in a given situation, making donor funding less important. Therefore, 
donor interests are not always the strongest motivational factor. 
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 The second implication is that the humanitarian organization will make decisions in line 
with the priorities and decisions of host governments. Because humanitarian organizations often 
operate in developing countries and are not funded by the host governments, they rely on support 
and coordination from host governments. While humanitarian organizations can play an 
important role in the security and well-being of host governments and their citizens, host 
governments they can also become burdens on the host government or push the limits of the host 
government’s generosity. At times, when the host government makes a specific request or 
decision regarding operations under an organization’s mandate, the organization will follow 
these decisions. This may occur when the host government wants to act against the mission of 
the organization because the humanitarian organization is eager to continue working with the 
host government or prevent a domino effect from leading other host governments to act 
similarly. If an organization loses its relationship with a host government, it is prevented from 
dealing with new emergencies within that country. If it loses several relationships, its ability to 
operate will be severely compromised. Many organizations strive to carry neutral and apolitical 
policies so that governments are less likely to expel them for having a motive or speaking against 
the host government. However, even neutral organizations can be expelled from countries. 
Therefore, it is important humanitarian organizations cooperate with host government and make 
decisions based on their relationship and the governments priorities. 
 The third implication is that an organization will make its decisions to appear in 
adherence to its mission. At times, humanitarian organizations make decisions that look based on 
their mandate because, if they fail to adhere to their mandate, they will lose their legitimacy and 
the authority they have over their mission and expertise. Also, often donor priorities and host 
government preferences contradict with this an organizations mandate. However, if the 
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organization chooses to blatantly contradict its mandate too frequently, it will lose its credibility. 
Therefore, some decisions are made in order to appear in adherence to the UNHCR’s mandate.  
 To examine this theory and its, this thesis will focus on examining how organizational 
survival influences the actions and policies of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in the context of the Great Lakes region of Africa. The UNHCR is an 
important example of a humanitarian organization because it was created only shortly after the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and has had considerable time to evolve as an 
organization. It is also interesting because it was formed with only a three year mandate and thus 
had to recreate itself in order to extend its existence. If my theory is correct, I expect three 
hypotheses for the UNHCR’s decision-making. Each of these hypotheses should come up at 
different points based on the UNHCR’s need for survival in the particular situation. 
- H1: The UNHCR makes decisions based on donor interests and financing. 
- H2: The UNHCR makes decisions based on priorities and decisions of host governments.  
- H3: The UNHCR makes decisions in order to appear to uphold its mission to protect 
refugees.  
 
 While the UNHCR operates in almost every region, this thesis will examine the Great 
Lakes region of Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa as a region has developed much slower than other 
regions. Within the Great Lakes regions, there have been two multi-country wars and other 
conflicts that have led to ongoing influxes of refugees and many protracted refugee situations. 
The countries in the region have been key countries for donors at certain points and much less 
important at others. Therefore the Great Lakes region of Africa is an ideal area within which the 
UNHCR’s actions and the reasons for them can be examined. In the next section, the situation of 
refugees in the Great Lakes Region and the UNHCR’s role will be described in much more 
depth.    
Conclusion 
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 Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in 1948, humanitarian 
organizations have grown both in number and in size. As they have become increasingly 
important actors in the fields of international affairs and international development, it has 
become important to understand how and why they change over time. Various international 
relations theories have also been used to address humanitarian organizations and understand the 
changes they make. However, all of these fail to understand that the underlying cause of mandate 
change by international humanitarian organizations combines both humanitarian ideals and 
donor needs. International humanitarian organizations make their decisions to deviate from their 
mandate based on their need to survive as organizations.  
Conclusion 
 Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in 1948, humanitarian 
organizations have grown both in number and in size. As they have become increasingly 
important actors in the fields of international affairs and international development, it has 
become important to understand how and why they change over time. Various international 
relations theories have also been used to address humanitarian organizations and understand the 
changes they make. However, all of these fail to understand that the underlying cause of mandate 
change by international humanitarian organizations combines both humanitarian ideals and 
donor needs. International humanitarian organizations make their decisions to deviate from their 
mandate based on their need to survive as organizations.  
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4. Background of the Rwandan Refugee Crisis 
 The Great Lakes refugee crisis of the 1990s is often regarded as one of the largest 
humanitarian failures in history, raising questions about humanitarian effectiveness and 
motivation. While the official refugee crisis has ended, there are still Rwandan refugees who 
have not returned to Rwanda and continue to lack confidence in calls to do so. This situation has 
turned into a protracted refugee situation for which the UNHCR struggles to find support from 
host countries and financing from donors. Recently, the UNHCR has declared that all Rwandan 
refugees from this crisis should lose their refugee status, which will lead to new rounds of 
migration in the Great Lakes Region and further decision-making by the UNHCR. Therefore, 
examining the UNHCR’s actions and policy choices during and following the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide add significant insight into the decision-making mechanisms and reasoning the 
UNHCR uses.  
 The borders of the countries in the Great Lakes region, as is true for most of Africa, were 
established after the 1884 Berlin Conference, which was held by European countries to carve up 
Africa and create new boundaries based on territories each country wanted to claim74. This is 
significant when looking at any conflicts or international relations among African countries. The 
conference drew borders without fully taking into account nationalism and unity or the location 
of different ethnic groups, some of which historically fought each other for decades beforehand. 
It also meant some boundaries were built across ethnic lines, separating ethnic groups into 
different states and paving the way for cross-boundary conflicts and the questioning of some 
people’s citizenship. These issues have had and continue to have a significant impact on refugee 
movements, definition, and citizenship, as will be discussed later. 
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4.1 Rwanda: A History 
 Rwanda is one of the few African countries where the borders, arbitrarily drawn during 
the Berlin Conference of 1884, encompassed more or less one people – the Banyarwanda. 
However, some of these Banyarwanda did fall outside of the borders, creating a heavily 
Banyarwandan population in Burundi and minorities in the neighboring countries of DRC and 
Uganda.  Within the Banyarwanda there are two distinct groups – the Hutus and Tutsis.75 It is 
unclear where the origin of these two distinct groups came from. Some claim the Tutsis are from 
Ethiopia while others claim the Belgians invented an ethnic distinction. Regardless, it is clear 
that the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis was exacerbated by the Belgians during colonial 
rule from 1916 to 1962 so as to better rule the population and maintain control.76 The Belgians 
systematically categorized the two groups, ending any mobilization between groups, and then 
trained and utilized Tutsis to run their affairs in government. Just before leaving and granting 
Rwanda independence on 1 July 1962, the Belgians had a shift in their own governance and this 
led them to started focusing on the rights and empowerment of the masses instead of the elites.77 
After years of training and elevating Tutsis above Hutus, the Belgians left power in the hands of 
the Hutus at independence. This added to already high ethnic tension between groups. The 
government has been controlled by one ethnic party ever since independence. 
 Around the time of independence, the Tutsi king died in 1959, spurring conflict between 
Hutus and Tutsis. With a large Hutu majority and a Hutu-controlled government, violence 
against the Tutsi led many Rwandan Tutsis to flee the country and live in exile as refugees in 
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traditionally Hutus were peasants that cultivated and were under Tutsi leadership. 
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nearby countries including Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and DRC. A number of the children of 
refugees in Uganda, having grown up in Uganda and not having experienced Rwanda except 
perhaps as young children, banded together to reclaim Rwanda and called themselves the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).78  It is important to understand the background to the Rwandan 
genocide to gain a better understanding of the complexity of ethnic conflict, victims, 
perpetrators, and blame because the perceptions of who is to blame greatly influences priorities 
and decisions regarding refugee groups. 
 In October 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda, creating a sense of insecurity for both the 
Hutu-dominated government of President Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana and the general Hutu 
population, who feared a Tutsi takeover. The government and media started antagonizing all 
Tutsis under the assumption that every Tutsi was in favor of the RPF takeover. This antagonism 
continued to grow. President Habyarimana finally travelled to peace talks in Arusha in the 
beginning of April of 1994. The two sides reached a deal, setting the stage to end the war. 
However, on his return trip, on April 6, Habyarimana was killed when his airplane was shot 
down.79 It is widely debated whether the RPF shot down this airplane or his own government did 
it to create a catalyst for what was to become genocide.80 At the time the shooting was 
represented to Rwandans as the work of the RPF. By the next morning, several roadblocks and 
checkpoints had been set up to stop any Tutsis attempting to leave. Over the next month, it is 
estimated that around 800,000 Tutsis were killed in what was later recognized as a massive 
genocide. There is much controversy over whether the government had planned and organized 
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  Genocide is, according to the United Nations, a series of “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole 
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the genocide ahead of time, since it had ordered many basic weapons beforehand and in a matter 
of hours had mobilized roadblocks and organized troops, both of government soldiers and Hutu 
civilians. 
Finally, the RPF put an end to the genocide by seizing control of Kigali on 19 July 1994. On 
their way through Rwanda into the capital, they carried out human rights violations of their own, 
a chapter of history often overlooked. Over 4 million people fled and became refugees in nearby 
countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and 
Zambia.81 While some fled for fear of retaliation, others left because they feared being 
prosecuted for the crimes they had committed. These countries had no filter for the entry of 
genocidaires, making the separation of criminals and refugees difficult.  
 During the genocide, there was what is now widely considered a failure to act by the 
international community. After the killing of Belgian peacekeepers, Western governments pulled 
humanitarian and aid workers out of Rwanda, including many of the peacekeepers posted in 
Rwanda. For the most part, this was the extent of the mobilization by Western governments in 
response to the genocide. The UNHCR, an organization in charge of assistance and protection 
for refugees, by mandate was to wait until individuals fled their country for fear of persecution to 
provide protection and assistance. However, most Tutsis were killed before ever crossing the 
border. The complete failure by UN agencies and any Western governments showed a 
breakdown in humanitarian efforts but also highlighted the importance of humanitarian 
intervention efforts, as the results without such could be dire, as was illustrated.  
 After the end of the genocide, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled, some because of 
fear of retaliation and some because of fear of the RPF, and went to nearby countries including 
Zambia, DRC, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. This time, the international community was 
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prepared to give humanitarian assistance to these victims of conflict. However, these countries 
and actors found themselves unequipped and unable to separate true refugees from war criminals 
fleeing conviction, a failure that would lead to further turmoil in both the near and distant future. 
This time the international community had acted, administering aid to all in need regardless of 
their past. Later, this would also be seen as a major failure of the humanitarian community, but 
for very different reasons. The evidence and data section will discuss how the UNHCR made its 
decisions regarding repatriation during this crisis based on its need to survive as an organizations 
and not solely on what would be best for the refugees. 
 While many of these refugees returned to Rwanda shortly after the RPF created stability 
in Kigali and the rest of Rwanda, many refugees also continued to fear returning. Strife in 
Western Rwanda also continued from 1996-1997, when Interhamwe attacked Rwanda from 
refugee camps in Eastern Congo, which led more Rwandans to flee. However, the situation in 
Rwanda soon stabilized, ending the open war between forces.82  
 This led many, including the Rwandan government and many host governments, to 
question the reason these refugees refused to return. Many, including both government officials 
and aid workers, came to the conclusion that these were genocidaires and war criminals fearing 
retribution and punishment. The Rwandan government has been heavily advocating to receive all 
of its refugees back in Rwanda. The government claims this is because every Rwandan deserves 
the opportunity to experience and live in freedom in Rwanda. However, it is more likely that the 
Rwandan government, having itself started out of refugee camps in Rwanda, seeks to bring all 
Rwandans back to Rwanda so as to not have to worry about the threat of insurgencies building 
form outside Rwanda. Those refugees that were women and children may not have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  There has been continued conflict since this event. However, it has been much less continuous and deadly, so 
Rwanda is still considered peaceful in this sense. The Rwandan government continues to fear intensified attacks 
and acts on it.	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perpetrators but were held by the Genocidaires and influenced not to return through lies and 
misinformation. Had any of these refugees not actually participated in the Genocide, any 
remaining outside of Rwanda were socially branded as perpetrators of Genocide, which would 
have a heavy influence on their treatment upon return to Rwanda. In this period of ambiguity and 
suspicion about outside refugees, there were two major forced repatriations of refugees back to 
Rwanda. The first forced repatriation was from Zaire to Rwanda in 1996 and the second was 
from Tanzania to Rwanda a month later. While these violate the principle of non-refoulement set 
out by the UNHCR charter, the UNHCR acted based on its need to survive as an organization 
instead of strictly obeying its mandates. The UNHCR’s reasoning behind its decision making in 
these instances of refoulement will be explored further in the data and evidence section.   
4.2 An Oppressive Rwandan Government 
 To fully understand the controversy surrounding the forced repatriation of Rwandan 
refugees and the cessation clause, it is important to first understand why refugees do not want to 
return and what conditions they are returning to. The Rwandan government has committed many 
human rights violations since taking power, leading new refugees to flee Rwanda as old refugee 
caseloads are encouraged to repatriate. 
 While civil war and conflict may have ended in Rwanda, the new Rwandan government 
quickly became repressive and used the genocide as leverage to ban free speech and make arrests 
of dissidents. The government gained international prestige for having brought an end to the 
genocide in Rwanda. However, the RPF had also committed a number of war crimes while 
coming to power which it refused to examine or try in court. Soon after the new government 
came in, it banned discussing ethnic identities. It also put down a series of vague laws such as the 
banning of promotion of genocide ideology that have since been used to target opponents. The 
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new government has gradually restricted freedoms such as freedom of speech. By many 
accounts, these have gotten worse since 2003. 
  Most recently, former RPF members have fled Rwanda and gone into exile to become 
political dissidents. In 2010, the government of Rwanda banned the director of Human Rights 
Watch from entering the country. In the 2010 elections the president had no political opposition. 
According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, there have been recent crackdowns on 
freedom of speech, especially for the press. The government arrested six journalists in 2010 on 
charges related to defamation. It closed two newspapers on charges of endangering national 
security and their editors fled. One journalist who was investigating sensitive cases also was 
murdered. While three new opposition parties operate in Rwanda, the government did not allow 
any to nominate candidates for the presidential elections. The government arrested some 
candidates or party members on various crimes such as endangering national security or 
promoting genocide ideology.83  
 As seen, there is strong evidence to show the Rwandan government has been oppressive 
since it took power and has grown more and more oppressive over time. This is an important 
background to understand when examining the UNHCR’s decision regarding the repatriation of 
refugees to Rwanda and the cessation of Rwandan refugees, as will be discussed further in the 
evidence and analysis discussion. 
4.3 Rwandan Refugees and Their Host Countries: Three Refoulements 
 This thesis examines three instances in which Rwandan refugees were forcefully 
repatriated to Rwanda and the decisions the UNHCR made in each situation. After understanding 
the situation in Rwanda under its current government, we can better understand why many 
refugees do not want to return to Rwanda. This next section summarizes the backgrounds to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Human Rights Watch, “Rwanda Country Summary,” January 2011. 
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situation of Rwandan refugees in each of three host countries, Zaire, Tanzania, and Rwanda and 
the forced removal they encountered in each location. 
Forced Repatriation and Conflict in Eastern Congo 
 Eastern Congo has been an area of concern in the Democratic Republic of Congo for 
years. Much of this conflict originated from ethnic divisions in the region, the most important of 
which involves native Banyarwandans. The conflict in Eastern Congo is generally concentrated 
in two provinces of the DRC – North Kivu and South Kivu. While both conflicts include 
Banyarwandans as key actors in the conflict, each has a slightly different background with the 
group. There have been multiple waves of Banyarwandan arrival in the DRC. First, as mentioned 
before, some Banyarwandans are native to DRC and were separated from other Banyarwandans 
by the 1884 redesignation of borders. Then Rwanda and Burundi were handed over from the 
Germans to the Belgians at the end of World War I. When there were too few workers in the 
Kivus for agricultural plantations, the Belgians decided to bring over workers from Rwanda and 
Burundi and actually created their own immigration service to do so.84 While Belgian authorities 
brought over many, many Banyarwandans also chose to migrate on their own account for work 
and land – Rwanda was heavily overpopulated. Additional Banyarwandan refugees moved to 
Eastern Congo in the periods of conflict in DRC, including 1959-1960, 1963-64, and 1973.85 
While there have been instances of discrimination and conflict between the Banyamulenge and 
other ethnicities in the group over time, the conflict existed for all purposes in 1992. In 1992, the 
Hunde (local Congolese) attacked the Banyamulenge and killed many of their cattle, the source 
of pride and livelihood for the group. In retaliation, the Banyamulenge murdered and disfigured a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Prunier, Gérard. "The Catholic Church and the Kivu Conflict." Journal of Religion in Africa. 31.2 (2001): 
139-162. Print. 
85 The timeline and details compiled in this history are derived from a number of sources, among them Gerard 
Prunier’s “African World War,” Mahmood Mamdani’s “When Victims Become Killers,” and John F. Clark’s 
“The African Stakes of the World War.” 
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Hunde chief. Starting in March 1993, heavy conflict broke out between the two groups until a 
peace deal was brokered by Mobutu and various local parties invited to participate. However, the 
peace did not last long, as soon Rwandan refugees fled into the Kivus, shaking the political and 
social balance in place. The arrival of Rwandan refugees was particularly threatening to locals 
because, should some of these refugees attempt to locally integrate, the numbers in North Kivu 
could make the Banyarwanda / Banyamulenge the most powerful group in the region. This 
political instability and redistribution of power showcases one of the key reasons host 
governments hold reservations about assisting refugees. Following the urging of the Hunde and 
other local groups, the Congolese government signed a declaration stripping all Banyarwanda of 
their Congolese citizenship on April 20, 1995.86 Mobutu ordered that all Rwandans leave the 
country shortly after. By July, ethnic tensions had risen dramatically and conflict broke out. By 
November of 1995, the violence both from and to refugees had become widespread.87  
 Matters were even more complicated because, as mentioned before, a number of the 
refugees were Hutu Interhamwe, who used the refugee camps as a location to rebuild, gain 
strength, and rely on as a base from which to attack Rwanda. Feeling threatened, by 1996 the 
Rwandan government offered the Congolese government an ultimatum – close the refugee 
camps or expect an attack. Soon after, the RPF attacked the refugee camps along the border, 
starting what would be the first of many direct or indirect attacks from Rwanda on Congo. These 
attacks on refugee camps blatantly violated the rights of refugees, putting them in danger. At the 
same time that these attacks were happening, the UNHCR encourage refugees to return to 
Rwanda and live under the very government that was attacking them and killing not only men 
but women and children. The  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Vlassenroot, K. "Citizenship, identity formation & conflict in South Kivu: the case of the Banyamulenge." 
Review of African Political Economy 29.93-94 (2002):499. 
87 Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War. 
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Other countries in the region quickly got involved, including Uganda, Burundi, and Angola, 
leading the period of 1996-1997 to be called the First African War. With the help of the 
Rwandan and Ugandan government, Laurent-Desire Kabila led the FPLA through Congo to take 
over the country. However, the UNHCR is rarely examined as much more than a passive, 
powerless force in the situation. As the primary organization in charge of refugees and refugee 
protection, it is important to examine the decisions made in a term of such turmoil and 
importance and why the UNHCR made the decisions it did. The refugee crisis in the Great Lakes 
Region brought to attention a number of questions about the UNHCR’s mandate and the proper 
labeling and treatment of refugees. Therefore, this is one of the points in UNHCR’s history 
where its decisions, and subsequent decisions in the region, make a significant impact on its 
ability to survive as an organization.  
Changing Refugee Policies in Tanzania 
  Up until their response to the post-Rwandan genocide refugee crisis, the Tanzanian 
government was known in the international humanitarian community for its welcoming and 
friendly refugee policies. During this time, the government characterized refugees as “resident 
guests88.” Julius Nyerere, the long-time leader of Tanzania, was a Pan-Africanist89, which led 
him to welcome refugees into Tanzania without hesitation. These refugee policies were also 
formed at a time when the Tanzanian population was much sparser, so incoming refugees were 
also a good source of labor for clearing some areas and beginning cultivation on unused land.90 
Tanzania also naturalized some of its Rwandan refugees as Tanzanian citizens, which was the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Chaulia, Sreeram S. "The Politics of Refugee Hosting in Tanzania: from Open Door to Unsustainability, 
Insecurity and Receding Receptivity." Journal of Refugee Studies. 16.2 (2003): 147-166. Print. 
89	  Pan-­‐Africanism	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  Africans	  should	  unite	  into	  one	  large,	  massive	  country	  instead	  of	  
being	  by	  the	  borders	  assigned	  by	  Europeans.	  This	  idea	  gained	  some	  momentum	  after	  many	  states	  had	  
recently	  reached	  independence	  but	  quickly	  fell	  out	  of	  favor	  and	  was	  seen	  as	  unrealistic.	  
90 Collier, Sarah. “Refugees in Tanzania: from ‘resident guests’ to ‘threats to national security’” Think Africa 
Press. 20 June 2011 http://thinkafricapress.com/refugees/refugees-tanzania-%E2%80%9Cresident-
guests%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%9Cthreats-national-security%E2%80%9D 
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first time local integration had been applied in Eastern Africa. However, once the RPF became 
the government of Rwanda, many of these citizens immediately left Tanzania and returned to 
Rwanda, calling into question the viability of extending citizenship.  
 After the Rwandan genocide of 1994, over 500,000 refugees fled to Tanzania. Initially, 
Tanzania received abundant support from donors to handle the situation. However, over time 
donor interest both waned and was redirected towards rebuilding Rwanda instead of helping 
refugees. Feeling like it had an unfair share of the burden, and having seen the massive 
orchestrated repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Zaire, the Tanzanian government then called 
a cessation of refugee status for all Rwandan refugees. This was a turning point in Tanzania’s 
strategy for refugees. There were likely a number of factors at play in this decision including the 
lack of funding, the high number of incoming refugees, and a lack of necessity for refugees to 
cultivate plots to stimulate the economy. However, the Tanzanian government did not want to 
send people back to Rwanda to be killed. Therefore, it allowed refugees to confess to committing 
genocide, after which they would be kept in a refugee camp in Tanzania instead of being sent 
back to Rwanda to face what would likely be a death sentence. This created a situation where 
only those who had committed crimes kept refugee status while those that were innocent were 
forced to return to Rwanda. After this, many of the refugees returned to Rwanda only briefly, 
found their homes destroyed or taken over, and continued on to Uganda, where they were once 
again granted refugee status.  
 After the massive repatriation, the Tanzanian government continued to accept refugees 
from Rwanda and other countries such as Burundi. However, it was evident that their priorities 
regarding refugees had changed drastically. The UNHCR decide to be supportive of Tanzania’s 
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declaration of cessation for Rwandan refugees. In the data and evidence section, the reason for 
the UNHCR’s supportiveness will be examined thoroughly.  
The Ugandan Government and its Refoulement 
Uganda is a key country for the UNHCR because many of its neighbors have been tumultuous, 
including Sudan (before the division), South Sudan (now), DRC, Kenya and Rwanda. The 
massive influx of refugees into Uganda began before the country’s independence and continues 
through today. Of the different groups of refugees in Uganda, the Ugandan government has 
always had a particularly complex relationship with Rwandan refugees. Despite their roots, both 
Rwandan migrants and refugees have played an active role in Uganda and been used as 
scapegoats and political tools by politicians. While there are a number of earlier instances of this 
being done, it is key in particular to understand the treatment of Rwandan refugees as President 
Yoweri Museveni came into power. Because of the early involvement of Rwandan refugees in 
Museveni’s march to power, many Rwandan refugees won important military positions. In 1987, 
Fred Rwigyema was named Deputy Minister of Defense in Kampala and Paul Kagame became 
the acting director of the Ugandan government’s intelligence. Other Rwandans held high 
positions as well. Media started covering the issue and brought much attention to the Rwandans’ 
positions in the military. Soon, descent became a more important requisite than experience for 
promotions and Rwigyema was demoted to a ceremonial position instead.91 Then, in September 
1990, Museveni declared that all Rwandan refugees living on ranches or elsewhere should return 
to settlements.92 While the Rwandan refugees had formed the RPF before this, they did not begin 
to attack Rwanda until they were no longer welcomed as citizens in Uganda. 
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92 Mamdani, Mahmood. “When Victims Become Killers” 
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Subsequently, in October 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda.93 While it is widely viewed that 
Museveni supported the RPF, the main reason seemed to be less supportive. Because of domestic 
political debate surrounding Rwandan refugees and their role in Rwanda, Museveni wanted the 
RPF out of Uganda and was willing to support them in their campaign if it meant having them 
leave for good.94 This set up a complicated relationship between Rwanda and Uganda. Uganda 
chose not to forcefully repatriate all of its refugees when Tanzania did and the Rwandan 
government was able to do in Zaire. Instead, Uganda was willing to be the country where once-
expelled refugees turned to in order to reinstate their status as refugees. After 1998, the Rwandan 
and Ugandan governments both sent forces into the DRC to support rebel groups to overthrow 
the recently installed (and previously supported) leader, Laurent Kabila. However, these forces 
ended up fighting each other, meaning the Rwandan and Ugandan governments were at war with 
each other. More recently, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments have been improving 
relations. However, one of the key parts of the conflict between governments is the remainder of 
Rwandan refugees in Uganda. While Uganda has organized voluntary repatriations in the past, 
the Rwandan government wants all refugee back and not only those who choose to return.  
In July 2010, the Rwandan government and Ugandan government orchestrated a refoulement of 
refugees from two refugee settlements in Uganda. In one settlement, the government told 
refugees they would be given food and in the other they were told they would be told their 
refugee status. The refugees were then surrounded by Ugandan police and rounded up onto 
trucks to be driven back to Rwanda. A couple of people jumped off the backs of the trucks and 
died or were severely injured. The Rwandan and Ugandan governments claimed that these were 
all asylum speakers that had been denied refugee status and, because people who fail to gain 
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refugee status often stay in Uganda or even in the camps illegally, the governments decided to 
round them up when they were supposed to tell them their status to prevent this. However, there 
is evidence that some of those sent back to Rwanda were refugees. The way in which the 
refoulement was conducted also meant that some families were split up and some children had to 
stay or leave without their parents. In the data and evidence chapter, the reasoning behind the 
UNHCR’s decisions about its actions during this refoulement will be uncovered.  
4.4 The UNHCR’s Final Decision: The Cessation Clause 
 The fourth case to consider is the cessation clause, which marks the beginning of the end 
of the Rwandan refugee crisis. This is an important decision to examine because it is tied not 
only to one particular host country but all countries hosting Rwandan refugees simultaneously. 
This is then a much wider and more final decision than any of the other case studies examined. 
Starting in early 2010, the UNHCR has announced plans to apply the cessation clause to all 
Rwandan refugees who fled Rwanda before December 31, 1997. Because of the lack of free and 
fair elections, the UNHCR postponed the cessation date and has since postponed the cessation a 
second time. As of now, cessation is supposed to take effect on 30 June 2013. This is being 
applied on the grounds that the conflict these refugees were fleeing has been resolved and 
therefore the conditions of fear no longer exist. However, many human rights organizations 
assert that the Rwandan government is oppressive and is unlikely to treat these former refugees, 
many of whom they suspect to be genocidaires, with respect and equality. In the evidence 
section, it will be explored why the UNHCR decided to announce the implementation of the 
cessation clause for Rwandan refugees and how it was for the purpose of organizational survival. 
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5. Evidence 
 Over the course of its operations with Rwandan refugees since 1994, the UNHCR has 
made many decisions that run counter to the directions they are given in their mandate. Of 
course, at any given point in time, the UNHCR faces complex pressures and influences from 
donors, host governments, and human rights organizations. These pressures have consistently 
pushed the UNHCR to contradict its mandate and endanger refugees in order to preserve its 
survival as an organization.  
 We expect to find that the UNHCR makes its decisions based on its need to survive as an 
organization. This would be demonstrated if the UNHCR makes its decisions based one each of 
the three hypotheses laid out in chapter 3. 
- H1: The UNHCR makes decisions based on donor interests and financing. 
 
- H2: The UNHCR makes decisions based on priorities and decisions of host governments.  
 
- H3: The UNHCR makes decisions based on upholding the perception that they are 
carrying out their mandate.  
 
 These hypotheses will be examined in the role the UNHCR chose to play in four different 
incidences of forced repatriation. In Zaire, the UNHCR encouraged and promoted the 
repatriation of refugees as rebel forces attacked the refugee camps and forced refugees towards 
Rwanda. In Tanzania, the UNHCR cooperated with the Tanzanian government and provided 
financial and material aid when the government decided to expel Rwandan refugees from 
Tanzania. In Uganda, the UNHCR failed to prevent or curtail refoulements carried out in 
Uganda. Now, despite many instances of voluntary and forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees 
back to Rwanda, a little over 100,000 Rwandan refugees remain outside of Rwanda, many of 
whom have been refugees since 1994. In 2009, in response to donor fatigue and host government 
agitation, the UNHCR decided to recommend that all host government declare cessation of 
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refugee status for all Rwandan refugees. Examining all four of these cases allows us to test my 
theory in a series of different contexts. 
5.1 Methodology and justification: 
 To examine the UNHCR’s decision-making mechanism I used a comparative study of 
four separate violations of the rights of refugees. This seemed the best approach with which to 
evaluate the work of the UNHCR because of the complex nature of refugee crises. To establish 
my theory, it was necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the UNHCR’s decisions in 
complex cases. A quantitative analysis would not have been conducive to exploring the 
complexities the UNHCR faces in making decisions. Because of the complexities of refugee 
situations and the variation between caseloads, academics in the field of refugee studies rarely 
attempt quantitative analyses. UNHCR should look to improve its available information and 
transparency.  
 I attempted a statistical analysis and discarded it for two primary reasons. First, there was 
a lack of clear information regarding the details and categories of refugee movements over time. 
Second, a matter such as refugee treatment is complex, event-based, and highly variable. A 
number of factors inevitably go into decisions regarding refugees, many of which cannot be 
quantified. It is also difficult to draw a line between the end of one refugee movement, crisis, or 
repatriation and the start of another – some involve ongoing crises or are part of a series of 
conflicts or events, especially when refugees become a cause of further conflict as is true in 
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.   
 The theory I set forward in this paper seeks to recognize the complexity of decision 
making for the UNHCR. Organizational survival includes a number of components including 
donor funding and interest, cooperation of host governments, and upholding the mandate to help 
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refugees. However, each of these variables is not independent from one another or from case to 
case. For example, decisions regarding adherence to mandate may be dependent on global 
perception of a previous decision made regarding refugees by the UNHCR. Therefore, it is only 
through the development of comparative case studies that this can be evaluated with integrity. 
Initially, I planned to do a comparative analysis of different time periods so as to demonstrate the 
effect of the end of the Cold War on donor attitudes and influence. However, I determined that 
because of the change in the nature of conflicts, it would be difficult to thoroughly examine a 
cross-comparison. The comparison will focus only on the diaspora and return of Rwandan 
refugees because, should different refugee crises be compared, it would be more difficult to 
account for and control for differences in the backgrounds of each case. I thus chose to examine 
the UNHCR’s decision-making processes in four separate incidences of forced repatriation of 
Rwandan refugees.  
 The research period for this project took place between October 2011 and November 
2012. The first two months of research involved field research in Uganda.   
 The field research in Uganda was conducted over the period of six weeks between 
October 24 and December 4, 2011. Four weeks were spent in Kampala and two were spent at 
Kyaka II Refugee Settlement. In Kyaka II Refugee settlement, research was conducted using key 
informants and Rwandese refugees. The translator was a Rwandan refugee who worked for the 
Ugandan Red Cross. Twenty five in-depth one-on-one interviews were conducted with various 
Rwandan refugees. Most were chosen by location, but selection was random. I also conducted 
five focus groups, (two all-male and three all-female) in each of which there were between four 
and seven individuals. The combined number led to account of over 60 Rwandan refugee 
respondents in Kyaka II.  
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 I gave those interviewed a form of consent that explained the research and gave them 
options as to what methods of recording would be used. Most Rwandan refugees were asked a 
certain set of questions that was altered slightly over time. The questions asked to various key 
informants differed drastically based on their area of focus. However, there were a set of 
questions asked to each of them for the purposes of cross-checking. Two separate surveys were 
conducted. One was conducted at Kyaka II using seven survey questions. The other was 
conducted in Kampala using eight similar questions altered due to the different environment. 
Key informant interviews included the Camp Commandant, a Refugee Welfare Council 2 
member (RWC 2), and another key informant wishing not to be identified. 
 In Kampala, refugees were targeted in a different manner. I helped to conduct English 
classes for a week to gain the trust and understanding of Rwandan refugees. Then I held 
interviews with five Rwandan refugees. Later, I hosted a workshop with the help of YARID95 on 
the topic. The workshop involved gathering 18 Rwandan refugees including human rights 
researchers, political dissidents, and other refugees. After the topic was thoroughly explained, the 
people (17 men and 1 woman) who were broken into three groups and came up with summarized 
answers to four sub questions. At the end, they presented the summaries and a discussion ensued. 
Afterwards, two with outstanding stories and experiences were interviewed in depth. Key 
informants were also interviewed through meetings set up and often rescheduled a few times. 
Key informants included a senior immigration officer at the Ministry of Affairs, a Legal / 
Protection Officer at the Office of the Prime Minister, the advisor on economic affairs for the 
Ministry of East African Affairs, and the First Secretary of the High Commission of Rwanda to 
Uganda. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  YARID stands for Young African Refugees for International Development and it is a community based 
organization which works to improve the lives of urban refugees in Kampala.	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 In the United States, I conducted an extensive literature review and gathered primary 
sources including internal US and UNHCR documents, human rights reports, and key interviews. 
For resources unavailable online, I made trips to the Library of Congress, the National Archives, 
and the National Security Archives. I also conducted three interviews were conducted online or 
via telephone with key stakeholders, including the former secretary to High Commissioner 
Sadako Ogata and former commissioner of UNRWA in Palestine and two formed heads of 
mission for USAID in the DRC.  
5.2 Limitations and Constraints 
 There were a number of constraints regarding the gathering of information from and 
about the UNHCR. The UNHCR’s records are stored in Geneva and thus many of the records 
that may have been crucial to this research due to financial, geographic, and time constraints. For 
these, some secondary sources cite various documents and the information is then cited in this 
research through a secondary source. The UNHCR has dramatically increased its transparently in 
recent years. There is a report for every year since 1999 regarding regional spending and donor 
amounts. Unfortunately, the years where this information would be most important for the 
purposes of this research, between 1990 and 1999, do not have such reports. I gathered data from 
UNHCR’s Refworld, which has statistics regarding refugees. Unfortunately, no database or list 
yet exists to explore a full list of cessations or voluntary repatriation efforts. Most information on 
countries is based on the most up-to-date information or conflict and does not have an extensive 
historical archive available online. These are areas where the  
 The research also requires use of inference, as rarely if ever do organizations directly 
state their motives for decision-making.  
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5.3 Case Study Introduction 
 While the UNHCR had to deal with a complex set of factors in each of the three forced 
repatriations I examine, each has a factor that ultimately influences the UNHCR’s decisions. If 
my theory is correct, I expect to find that the UNHCR makes each decision based on donor 
financing, host government support, and adherence to mandate. If the UNHCR always makes its 
decision because of the same reason, this would prove my hypothesis incorrect. To show that the 
UNHCR makes decisions based on its need to survive, it is necessary that it makes decisions 
based on different factors based on the circumstances it faces. Below is a table that outlines each 
of the case studies that will be evaluated this chapter. This table allows us to compare each of the 
cases and the actions that were taken to each other so as to understand the different reasons for 
UNHCR’s varied actions.  
 Zaire Tanzania Uganda Cessation Clause 







Rwandan refugees will lose 
their refugee status. 



















Claims to be 
unaware.97”  









force against their 
will.  
Logistically, the 
UNHCR could not 
have been unaware. 
Evidence shows Rwanda is 











appeared to be upheld 
without contradiction. 
H1 and H2: Lack of donor 










Didn’t want to 
appear out of 
control of the 
situation. 
Needed to appear to 
uphold its mandate to 
maintain legitimacy. 
Needed to ensure 
continued donor and host 
government support.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 “Ogata Urges Rwandan refugees to consider repatriation.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
25 October 1996.  
97 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Rwanda-Uganda: Kampala urged to end "gunpoint" 
deportations, 15 July 2010, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c4562b01e.html [accessed 21 
October 2012 
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5.4 Zaire: Repatriation through Massacre, the UNHCR, and Donor Priorities 
 In June 1996, the Rwandan president warned the US government that if Zaire or the 
international community did not effectively end the militarization of refugee camps in Eastern 
Congo, they would take action.98 Soon after, by September 1996, a rebel force supported by and 
including the Rwandan military began attacking refugee camps99100. While initially aiming to kill 
Interhamwe that continued to be militarized and had killed Tutsis during the genocide, the 
attacks on refugee camps quickly turned against women and children who were not participants 
in genocide or continued attacks.101  The Rwandan government wanted all refugees to return for 
the reasons discussed in the background chapter. During the attacks on refugees in Zaire, even 
before the UNHCR recommended that refugees repatriate, the Rwandan government had 
recommended that refugees return so as to avoid the conflict.102  
 The UNHCR searched for solutions, including the creation of an armed security force. 
However, the primary solution the UNHCR offered and endorsed for refugees was repatriation to 
Rwanda. While numerous UNHCR documents indicated an interest in promoting repatriation, it 
became official in a radio announcement made by High Commissioner Sadako Ogata, on 
October 25, 1996. In the announcement, Ogata reiterated that refugees could choose where 
they’d prefer to stay but that they should consider whether they would be safer in Rwanda or 
Zaire. She used the example of refugees repatriated from Burundi living peaceful lives and spoke 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Prunier, Gérard. Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print. 
99	  While the Rwandan government didn’t officially admit to its support of the rebel forces until later, there is 
extensive evidence that the Rwandan government was involved, including newspaper articles with threats form 
the Rwandan government and even a quote from a general reporting Rwandan attacks on dangerous elements in 
Zaire. Evidence from Voices of America, Reuters, and USAID was uncovered within a week after Ogata’s radio 
announcement, but UNHCR continued to encourage repatriation. 
100 Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. Print. Pages 52-56 
101 Internal US government document discussing the attacks on refugee camps.  
102 Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War. 
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of the Rwandan government’s commitment to peacefully resettling returned refugees. She also 
emphasized the presence of the international community and international observers in Rwanda. 
While the UNHCR did not transfer refugees directly from the camps, they set up three transit 
centers with materials such as blankets and agricultural supplies for returnees, as well as busses 
to take refugees back to their home districts.103  The UNHCR decided to endorse and support 
repatriation, but only made its repatriation services available at the Rwandan borders because of 
the tumultuous situation in the refugee camps. The UNHCR claimed they decided to encourage 
and assist in repatriation because Rwanda was moving towards peace and the international 
community was there to assist returnees with reentering Rwandan society.104  
 However, in reality the Rwandan government was attacking and killing many of the same 
refugees being told by the UNHCR it was safe to go home. As stated in an Amnesty International 
Report, 
“It quickly became apparent to Amnesty International and other observers who were present in 
Gisenyi between 15 and 19 November that the Rwandese authorities had wrested control of the 
operation from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-
governmental humanitarian organizations.105” 
 
 Despite losing control of the situation, the UNHCR did not change its endorsement of 
repatriation and even claimed the operation went well. If a government was willing to kill its 
own citizens, including innocent women and children, and felt the need to take over repatriation 
operations from the UNHCR in order to force the refugees to repatriate, there is no basis for a 
claim that these same refugees would then be safe in Rwanda. While it may not yet have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Much of this paragraph is from “Ogata urges Rwandan refugees to consider repatriation” 
104	  While the UNHCR could make a strong argument that Rwanda was safer for refugees than remaining in 
Zaire, the Rwandan government was able to persecute its refugees across borders in order to create the 
conditions that made Zaire less safe than Rwanda, thereby encouraging the pursuance of refugees across 
borders.	  
105 Amnesty International, Human Rights Overlooked in Mass Repatriation, 1 January 
1997, AFR/47/02/97, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a9912c.html [accessed 2 
December 2012] 
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directly proven, there was significant evidence indicating the Rwandan government’s role in the 
rebel camps, including the warning given to the US government. When examining this evidence, 
it is clear the UNHCR did not believe the situation in Rwanda was safe for the repatriation of 
refugees.  If the UNHCR’s decision-making follows my first hypothesis, the UNHCR made this 
decision based on donor interest and funding. 
 While initially heavy funding rolled in for Rwandan refugee camps,106 the militarization 
of refugee camps and the heavy presence and influence of genocidaires soon became apparent 
and changed donor attitudes. Many governments had originally been eager to make up for their 
failure to stop the genocide by supporting refugees. However, the change in perception led these 
governments to instead assist the new Rwandan government. Donors gathered in Geneva, 
Switzerland for a roundtable meeting in June 1996, a little over two years after the refugee crisis 
began. At the roundtable donors came to agree that funding should be focused on repatriation 
and reintegration of Rwandan refugees into Rwanda instead of continuing to fund emergency 
and humanitarian aid.107 This roundtable indicated what decisions they thought should be made 
and were willing to support the UNHCR in making. While the UNHCR has a significant amount 
of discretionary spending within its general budget, it did not have the funds necessary to cover 
the size and complexity of its caseload of Rwandan refugees. The UNHCR subsequently lost its 
ability to financially or materially support the hundreds of thousands of refugees now abandoned 
by the international community because of this change in perception. If the UNHCR chose to 
continue supporting these refugees, they would likely both lose the support of many donors and 
would run into bankruptcy or keep refugees in camps without suitable living conditions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  This actually led to profits for many humanitarian organizations (though there is no evidence that the 
UNHCR received profits).	  
107 Whitaker, B. "Document. Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: the Rwandan Repatriation from 
Tanzania." Refugee Survey Quarterly. 21 (2002): 328-344. Print. 
 
	   73	  
assistance. The proposition of the donors also offered the UNHCR the opportunity to gain 
significant funding for both repatriation and improvement of conditions in Rwanda, a relatively 
new role the UNHCR was expanding to fill.108  
 In addition to financial support, the US government, the UNHCR’s largest funder, also 
offered detailed plans regarding logistical help and other help for the UNHCR that they would 
not normally offer. According to confidential US documents, plans outline what the US wanted 
to assist the UNHCR in doing, including finding refugees to tour Rwanda and report back 
findings, setting up border points, and providing other assistance for the organization.109110 This 
level of interest and involvement by the United States government was much higher than usual, 
in part because of the US government’s strategic interests in an alliance with the Rwandan 
government.111  
 This is strong inferential evidence supporting my first hypothesis that the UNHCR’s 
decisions in the case of the massive repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Zaire were based on 
the priorities and interest of donor governments. The UNHCR’s decisions clearly aligned with 
the priorities of donors and there is significant evidence that the UNHCR would not have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  	  This offered the UNHCR an enticing opportunity to expand its role in the emergence of hanging priorities 
regarding refugees. This changed moves refugee aid away from protracted humanitarian assistance and asylum 
toward country of origin development so as to speed along repatriations. While expansion of mandate could 
have motivated the UNHCR’s decisions, it is unlikely because, during this period, the UNHCR was already 
overextended and did not need to consider expansion. The UNHCR has since expanded its development 
operations so that, to assist in preparing countries of origins for the return of refugees, the UNHCR helps with 
development efforts to make return conditions more favorable. This is a drastic change in its role but also 
allows it to expand and be more effective as an organization. 
109 Multiple US internal documents now available on the state department website outlined the plans of the US 
government. These documents can be found at: http://www.state.gov/m/a/ips/c43954.htm. 
110	  	  European interests were not as aligned with Rwanda as neatly aligned with Rwanda. In fact, France and the 
US often disagreed. In her book, Ogata notes this but praises the assistance and support of the US and 
condemns the Rwandan government for aligning with the former Interhamwe government, with whom it had 
close relations. Indeed, the United States’ high levels of donor funding often makes its decisions and priorities 
more important than those of other countries.	  
111 Gribbin, Robert E. In the aftermath of genocide: The US role in Rwanda. iUniverse, 2005. 
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able to financially support decisions conflicting with these priorities nor able to guarantee the 
continuing support of these donors in future refugee crises. 
 While it is evident that the UNHCR made this decision based on donor funding, it is still 
important to examine how my other hypotheses supported or contradicted the first hypothesis. 
First we must assess whether the UNHCR’s decisions align with the priorities of the host 
government. In this situation, the host government of Zaire had little authority or influence. 
Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko was dying of cancer and had not named anyone to take his place. As 
Zaire’s central government was crumbling, it had little authority over Eastern Zaire, where it had 
never held significant support.112 Within two years of this forced repatriation, the rebel forces 
that were attacking refugees had taken over the government and were running Zaire and renamed 
it the Democratic Republic of Congo. Therefore the host government’s opinions about 
repatriation were not important to the UNHCR’s decisions.113 We must also evaluate whether the 
UNHCR’s were in line with the preservation of its mandate. In the context of Zaire, the 
UNHCR’s lack of effective action regarding the militarization of refugee camps had already 
called into question its mandate and even its existence,114 as the refugee camps were leading to 
further conflict and the refugees were not receiving protection. The UNHCR was almost seen as 
a nonfactor and observer. The literature on the crisis makes only scarce mentions of the 
UNHCR.115 When UNHCR is mentioned, it is often to cite UNHCR statistics or observations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Zaire did send troops to secure the refugee camps. However, the numbers were low and the Zairean soldiers 
found themselves struggling to defend the refugee camps, which was unsurprising considering the same rebel 
forces defeated the Zairean army soon after. 
113	  It was, in fact, the initial lack of action from the government of Zaire to curtail camp militarization that led 
the Rwandan government to support rebel forces. During this time, Zaire’s all-powerful dictator Mobutu Sese 
Seko was sick with cancer and left no one in charge of making decisions in his absence. 
114 Koser, Khalid, and Richard Black. "The end of the refugee cycle." The end of the refugee cycle (1999): 2-17. 
115 Reyntjens, Philip, The Great War and Prunier, Gerard African World War are two prominent examples 
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and not actions.116 Therefore, while the UNHCR would be going against its mandate by 
promoting return to Rwanda when conditions were not safe, decisive action was more important 
for the UNHCR’s legitimacy than strict adherence to the mandate. However, because this 
reasoning could not be stated without leading the UNHCR to lose credibility, the UNHCR 
promoted repatriation as a safe option where returnees would be met with peace and easy 
reintegration when it knew this would not likely be the case. Therefore, the UNHCR did make an 
attempt to appear in line with its mandate even though its actions clearly endangered the refugees 
it was supposed to support.  
 
5.5 Tanzania: The Decision of a Host Government and UNHCR Cooperation 
 After seeing the massive repatriations from Zaire take place, the Tanzanian government 
decided it wanted to repatriate refugees from Tanzania as well. The government of Tanzania and 
the UNHCR together drafted a plan to invoke the cessation clause for refugees in Tanzania. 
Together, they announced on December 5, 1996 that all Rwandan refugees were expected to 
leave by December 31, 1996.117 The announcement led many refugees to flee the camps into the 
Tanzanian bush so they would not be sent back to Rwanda. In response, the Tanzanian 
government used armed forces to redirect the refugees towards Rwanda. Under the cessation 
clause, individuals were able to appeal for asylum if they could prove they would face harm and 
persecution upon returning to Rwanda. Because this was an organized cessation, the Tanzanian 
government was willing and able to work with the UNHCR to help those that could prove 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  In fact, the UNHCR was confused about its own role. When a UNHCR official was asked by Amnesty 
International why the UNHCR didn’t prevent the Rwandan government from overtaking a refugee camp 
hospital, the official stated it was not the UNHCR’s responsibility. 
117	  It was unlikely that the UNHCR had intentions to undertake such a repatriation until the Tanzanian 
government came forward with the decision. According to an internal USAID memorandum, the UNHCR had 
predicted in October of 1994 that less than ten percent of Rwandan refugees would repatriate from Zaire within 
three years.  
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persecution, which was not an option during the Zairean repatriation. Unfortunately, 
circumstance led this to contradict one of the main incentives actors had to return refugees – the 
return of genocidaires to Rwanda for trial and prevention of further attacks from refugee camps. 
Because many genocidaires were at risk of hanging or death in Rwanda, refugees admitting to be 
genocidaires were allowed to maintain asylum in Tanzania. However, innocent Rwandan 
refugees were forced to return to Rwanda against their will. If the main concern about refugee 
camps was militarization under genocidaires, this repatriation effectively separated the innocent 
from the genocidaires. Unfortunately, it stripped innocent refugees of their refugee status in the 
process. Many of these refugees chose to flee Rwanda again, this time to Uganda, creating a new 
influx of refugees instead of effectively reintegrating refugees into Rwanda.118 
 At the time of the declaration of cessation of refugee status for Rwandans in Tanzania, 
the UNHCR claimed that conditions had improved significantly enough that the conditions under 
which the refugees fled no longer existed in Rwanda, allowing for the cessation of refugee status 
under the law.119 Later, after facing much criticism for decisions made in Tanzania, High 
Commissioner Ogata wrote in her memoir “We might have disassociated ourselves from the 
operation. Instead, what we did was compromise, to save what little there was to save.120” This 
indicates that UNHCR realized it was going against its mandate and had consciously decided to 
do so. However, at the time they were again unwilling to admit to this contradiction because 
doing so would quickly lost the UNHCR legitimacy and would undo the support it would be able 
to maintain from the Tanzanian government by participating in the orchestration of the 
repatriation. In this case, the UNHCR admits to contradicting its mandate but claims to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 This is based on numerous interviews conducted in Kyaka II refugee settlement.  
119	  For more information on the circumstances in Rwanda at this time, read the background chapter. 
120 Ogata, Sadako N. The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s. New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2005. Print. P. 255 
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done this so as to have a role in the repatriation instead of leaving it entirely to the Tanzanian 
government. If my second hypothesis is correct, the UNHCR decided on its actions based on the 
priorities and decisions of the host government of Tanzania.   
 Having seen massive refoulement of Rwandan refugees from Zaire with UNHCR 
encouragement, the Tanzanian government wanted to carry out a massive repatriation. The 
Rwandan government strongly supported any effort to repatriate refugees back to Rwanda and 
pressured Tanzania to repatriate refugees so it would not be sucked into the regional conflict that 
was unfolding.121 This was both a warning regarding the refugee population and a threat from the 
Rwandan government. The pulling of funding from the international community also left the 
Tanzanian government worried it would be responsible for the funding of assistance that the 
international community was no longer willing to give. Tanzania saw the refugee population as a 
burden that the international community was not willing to share, as the concept of “burden 
sharing” often stems from the financial support of international donors and physical and land 
support from the host government. This time, the lack of financial aid available for refugee 
camps influenced Tanzania’s actions more so than the UNHCR’s. However, because financial 
aid and burden-sharing is often a key bargaining-chip for the UNHCR to use to entice host 
governments to cooperate, losing the support decreased the UNHCR ability to work with the host 
government. In less developed countries, the UNHCR is often able to maintain power because 
developing countries worry that donor governments will pull their aid if they break the protocol 
they signed. However, the Tanzanian government has more money and independence than 
another of other governments. As the host government had decided to do so whether or not the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Chaulia, Sreeram S. "The Politics of Refugee Hosting in Tanzania: from Open Door to Unsustainability, 
Insecurity and Receding Receptivity." Journal of Refugee Studies. 16.2 (2003): 147-166. Print. 
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UNHCR chose to help in the efforts. This narrowed the UNHCR’s choices for action, as it was 
no longer making the decision of whether or not the repatriation would take place. The UNHCR 
relies heavily on Tanzania to continue supporting refugees fleeing a diverse set of conflicts in 
East Africa. Because Tanzania has often cooperated in hosting refugees in the past, the 
government has had a positive relationship with the UNHCR. In anticipation of future conflicts, 
it is then important for the UNHCR to maintain a positive relationship with the Tanzanian 
government. Ms. Karen AbuZayd, former Secretary to Commissioner Ogata, noted in an 
interview that the UNHCR relies on host governments to be asked to help with refugee 
situations, putting the organization at the whim of host governments. Also, if the UNHCR chose 
to step away and condone the Tanzanian repatriation of refugees to Rwanda, it would be 
allowing a massive refoulement to take place without making any serious efforts to stop it and 
once again it would be seen as a bystander. This could lead other host countries to believe they 
could just as easily commit refoulement without being stopped by the UNHCR. This led the 
UNHCR to cooperate with Tanzania instead of condemn its actions.  
 While it is evident that the UNHCR made this decision based on my second hypothesis, it 
is still important to examine how my other hypotheses supported or contradicted the second 
hypothesis. My first hypothesis is that the UNHCR’s decisions are based on donor funding. The 
funding for this repatriation was similar to that of the repatriation from Zaire. There was a heavy 
focus on repatriation from the international donor community, leaving little money for refugee 
camps. This situation was not considered as urgent by the international community because the 
camps had not become militarized and started attacking Rwanda as was the situation. However, 
under the assumption that power dynamics in Tanzanian camps were similar to those in Zaire, 
the international community supported repatriation over the maintenance of refugee camps. 
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Internal documents from the US government indicate that, while the US government recognized 
the importance of reconciling the situation in Tanzania, it was more of an afterthought in 
comparison to Zaire.122 The international community had made its priorities clear, but was 
significantly less focused on oversight for this repatriation. This supports my first hypothesis that 
UNHCR’s decisions are in line with donor priorities. My third hypothesis is that UNHCR makes 
decisions based on the appearance of adherence to its mandate to protect refugees. In this case, 
the UNHCR supported my hypothesis by making a decision that would make it look as though it 
was helping the refugees even though, as admitted later by Commission Ogata, this was a forced 
repatriation and not in the refugee’s favor123. While the militarization of the refugee camps in 
Zaire made the UNHCR’s violation of its mandate less clear, in the situation of Tanzanian 
refugee camps it was clear to the UNHCR that, unless the safety of Rwanda was exaggerated, 
Tanzania was about to take part in a massive refoulement124. This had the potential to do a lot of 
damage the UNHCR’s reputation implications for the UNHCR, already in a crisis of legitimacy 
as many had lost confidence in its role and abilities. If UNHCR participated in the refoulement, 
called it a repatriation, and lent credence to it, the UNHCR would have a role in the repatriation. 
While the UNHCR was aware of the possibility of criticism from human rights organizations, 
donor governments, the Rwandan government, and the Tanzanian government were all in favor 
of repatriation. Indeed, the UNHCR did receive condemnation from Amnesty International and 
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  According to an internal report by the US Mission to Dar Es Salaam filed as early as October 1994,  “The 
demands imposed…elsewhere in the world make it harder for the Tanzanian part of the Rwandan / Burundian 
crisis to the the attention it needs to avoid a worsening of the solution.”	  
123	   Ogata, Sadako. The Turbulent Decade.	  
124	  In her book, The Turbulent Decade. Commissioner Ogata admits that decisions were made in part because 
the UNHCR understood the implications of the Tanzanian government’s decision and wanted to be able to 
somehow help the refugees.  
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Human Rights Watch.125 Therefore it is evident that the UNHCR’s decisions in the Tanzanian 
repatriation were made in order to appease the Tanzanian government and in alignment with 
donor priorities, even though it conflicts with its ission to protect refugees. 
 
5.6 Uganda: A Coordinated Refoulement and UNHCR’s Questionable Condemnation 
 On July 14 and 15 in 2010, the Government of Uganda and the Government of Rwanda 
together carried out a refoulement of 1,700 asylum seekers and refugees back to Rwanda. They 
informed several asylum seekers at Kyaka II refugee settlement in Western Uganda that they 
would receive food rations in the fenced in area where World Food Program kept food stored on 
14 July. The asylum seekers who showed up were surrounded by Ugandan police officers, who 
shot blank rounds to intimidate the refugees, rounded them up onto trucks, and drove them back 
to Rwanda. A similar incident occurred in Nakivale settlement on the same day. In Nakivale, 
refugees were instead told they would be informed whether or not they would receive refugee 
status. Two people jumped out of the trucks, one of whom died. One Rwandan refugee who lived 
near the center stated that he found the situation suspect because the asylum seekers had been 
told to bring their families and the Government of Uganda was giving out the food, a role the 
Norwegian Refugee Council usually played as an implementing partner of the UNWFP and 
UNHCR126127. According to the Camp Commandant, these were not asylum seekers or refugees 
but illegal immigrants. They had entered the country illegally and internal affairs was in charge 
of deporting illegal immigrants. He claimed “There is no single Rwandan refugee or asylum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Amnesty International, Human Rights Overlooked in Mass Repatriation, 1 January 
1997, AFR/47/02/97, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a9912c.html [accessed 2 December 
2012] 
 
126	  These organizations often hare information and have a positive relationship. 
127 Rwandan refugee, Interview. Kyaka II, Uganda. 11 November 2011.  
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seeker who was taken back. Each country has its immigration laws and they have to be followed. 
We screened them.128” However, rejected asylum seekers are also required by law to be given 
the opportunity to appeal the rejection of refugee status and many of these refugees had not yet 
been told that they were rejected. Also, UNHCR records showed many of the refugees were in 
fact asylum seekers. Therefore there is substantial proof that this was an instance of refoulement. 
 This refoulement had long-lasting detrimental effects, not only on the refugees forced 
back to Rwanda (many of whom soon returned to Uganda) but for all Rwandan refugees living in 
refugee settlements in Uganda. The incident came up without provocation in every interview and 
focus group held, both in Kyaka II and in Kampala. Some refugees interviewed felt this 
confirmed the fact that the Rwandan government was not peaceful and stable but oppressive 
enough that it was not even willing to allow individuals the choice of whether or not to return. 
Many also felt anger and resentment at the UNHCR for failing to protect them. Many refugees 
lived in constant fear that they would be sent back. A few refugees stated that, after the 
refoulement, they had hidden in the bush surrounding the refugee settlement and only returned to 
take care of their plots. One or two stipulated that they continued to do so through the end of 
2011.   
 The UNHCR claimed to have no prior knowledge of the refoulement and condemned the 
repatriation shortly after it took place. A statement issued by the UNHCR stated to the contrary 
that “The operations were targeted at failed asylum seekers, but UNHCR has received 
confirmation that recognized refugees were among those returned to Rwanda.129”  
 However, it is likely that the UNHCR was aware of the refoulement. A Ugandan 
government official claimed in an interview that “the UNHCR knows about. It was not done in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Kyaka II Camp Commandant. Interview. Kyaka II, Uganda, 8 November 2011. 
129 UN, “UN agency deplores forced returns of Rwandan refugees from Uganda,” 16 July 2010. 
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secrecy130.” Because of the set up of refugee settlements, it would have been difficult if not 
impossible for the government of Uganda to carry out the operation without UNHCR knowledge. 
The government would be taking over a role that the World Food Program (WFP) or its 
implementing partner was responsible, which would be suspicious and require investigation. 
Already, the Government of Uganda was notorious for bias against Rwandan asylum seekers by 
the Ugandan government, as even the UNHCR had previously noted.131 Informing those who 
were to be at the meeting would also have taken coordination and information would have spread 
to the UNHCR. Finally, there are not many roads into the settlements. The UNHCR would have 
seen the deportation trucks entering the refugee settlements. If the UNHCR knew about the 
refoulement, the question remains as to why they allowed it to happen and then condemned it 
afterwards, instead of taking a part to ensure safety as it had done in Tanzania. If my theory is 
correct, this repatriation should support my third hypothesis that the UNHCR makes decisions 
based on adherence to its mandate to support refugees and support by human rights 
organizations. 
 The UNHCR’s decision took into account its legitimacy through its mission. If the 
UNHCR had officially taken part in the refoulement, it likely would have received condemnation 
from human rights organizations and, possibly, donor governments. Unlike the other larger 
forced repatriations, this plan depended on secrecy so that the governments could return the 
asylum seekers and refugees it wanted to return. Many of these undocumented immigrants were 
asylum seekers who had been denied status as refugees but still did not want to return to their 
host countries.  According to the Kyaka II Camp Commandant, the Ugandan government 
estimated that there were almost as many illegal immigrants living in the refugee settlements as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 “Rwanda-Uganda: Kampala urged to end “gunpoint”deportations” IRIN 15 July 2010.  
131 International Refugee Rights Initiative and Refugee Law Project. “A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in 
Uganda,” Citizenship and Displacement in the Great Lakes Region. Working Paper No. 4. June 2010. 
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there were refugees, putting a further strain on resources, security and space132. It can be inferred 
that this problem also caused problems for the UNHCR. The governments of Uganda and 
Rwanda decided that a forced round-up of the asylum seekers was the best way to cope with this 
and ensure the return of some unsuccessful asylum seekers. However, a round-up can and did 
lead to the round up of some refugees who were not there illegally and suffered, a consequence 
which the UNHCR could not be associated with. However, the decision to stay silent and not 
play a role until condemning the action afterwards did not have a detrimental effect on 
legitimacy. In the case of Tanzania, the UNHCR’s legitimacy had already been called into 
question before the refoulement and the refoulement was much larger (hundreds of thousands of 
refugees), whereas in this case the UNHCR’s legitimacy was not being questioned and the 
number of refugees repatriated was less significant.133 Therefore, the UNHCR had much more to 
risk in terms of its legitimacy and survival as an organization by assisting with the refoulement 
than by claiming to be unaware of the plan, despite the fact that many refugees and asylum 
seekers were denied their rights and some were hurt. The UNHCR was successful in avoiding 
criticism. Because they lacked evidence that UNHCR was involved, human rights organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International condemned the governments of 
Rwanda and Uganda and used the UNHCR as a source to describe the violation.134 This 
reinforced the UNHCR’s adherence to its mandate even though it had allowed a refoulement to 
occur from two separate refugee camps simultaneously.  
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  Kyaka II Camp Commandant, Interview. Kyaka II, Uganda. 8 November 2011.	  
133	  In an interview with a former USAID Congo Mission Director, a discussion of the number of refugees that 
would constitute a repatriation effort came up and he noted that, in the context of the Rwandan refugee crisis, 
even 10,000 would be relatively insignificant when, at its peak, there were over 1.5 million refugees who had 
fled Rwanda. This puts the insignificance of 1,700 in perspective. 
134 Amnesty International: ‘Uganda forcibly returns 1,700 Rwandan asylum-seekers’ 16 July 2010. And 
Human Rights Watch, “Uganda: Halt Forced Returns of Refugees” 16 July 2010.	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  While it is evident that the UNHCR made this decision based on my second 
hypothesis, it is still important to examine how my other hypotheses supported or contradicted 
the second hypothesis. The first concern is donor funding. Donors have little interesting in 
funding Rwandan refugees in protracted situations, so little funding was flowing to help 
accommodate these refugees and asylum seekers. The UNHCR was also running out of space 
and plots available for incoming refugees. However, money would also not be available for a 
small-scale repatriation, as large repatriations and full cessation has become the focus of the 
international community. Similarly, donor interest in the situation is low. No foreign 
governments officially condemned the refoulement after it happened. It is also important to take 
into consideration the will of the host government. The UNHCR relies heavily on the generosity 
of the Ugandan government. The Ugandan government is generally very generous to other 
groups seeking refuge in Uganda, though asylum seekers from Rwanda have become an 
exception.135  However, because of Uganda’s important position with regards to refugee flows 
from (South) Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is important that the UNHCR 
cooperate with Uganda to maintain its legitimacy and ability to operate within Uganda.  
5.7 The Invocation of the Cessation Clause 
The UNHCR has been assessing the situation in Rwanda to consider whether cessation should be 
invoked for Rwandan refugees in Uganda since 2002. In Uganda there were large rounds of 
voluntary repatriation in both 2005 and 2009.136 In 2009, the UNHCR decided to invoke the 
cessation clause for December 31, 2011. But the complexity of the situation led the UNHCR to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Kron, Josh. “Tricked, Rwandan refugees are driven home, UN says,” 16 July 2010. New York Times.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/world/africa/17uganda.html?_r=0 
136 Kyaka II Camp Commandant. Interview. Kyaka II. 8 November 2011. 
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push the date back until June 30, 2012 and again until December 31, 2013.137 The UNHCR 
argues that, under the legal definition, the cessation clause may be invoked because the 
circumstance that allowed in the mass influx between 1994 and 1998 – war – is no longer in 
existence.  
However, the current situation in Rwanda brings the invocation of the cessation clause into 
question. Before the UNHCR officially declared the invocation, the Rwandan government began 
informing refugees that the cessation clause was to be invoked on December 31, 2011138, 
showing the Rwandan government’s willingness to stretch the truth regarding the cessation 
clause. A number of different reports have cited Rwanda’s blatant advocacy for the UNHCR’s 
invocation, including Human Rights Watch, an IRIN report, the Refugee Law Project, and the 
International Refugee Rights Initiative. 
Indeed, even a UNHCR evaluation of whether cessation should be invoked mentions three main 
concerns about the current situation in Rwanda; lack of political freedom and freedom of speech, 
lack of fairness in the justice system and specifically the Gacaca process, and lack of fairness and 
effectiveness in resolving land issues.139  The Gacaca courts were originally being held open so 
that returned refugees could be tried if they were suspected to be genocidaires. However, in part 
as a bid to get Rwandan refugees to return, the Gacaca courts were closed on June 18, 2012.140 
The report, “Questions and Answers on UNHCR Comprehensive Strategy on Rwandese Refugee 
Situation,” sidesteps a definitive evaluation. Instead, it includes about the allegations such as 
phrases such as “what they claim,” “what they say,” and “several asserting” so as to avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Okoth-Obbo, George “Follow up on Implementation of the Roadmap for the Comprehensive Conclusion of 
the Rwandan Refugee Situation, including invocation of the Cessation Clause,” Memorandum, UNHCR, 30 
September 2011. 
138 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Rwandan refugees reluctant to repatriate, 2 November 
2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4eb3d3702.html 
139 UNHCR Comprehensive Strategy for the Conclusion of the Rwandan Refugee Chapter. 
140 BBC Online “Rwandan ‘Gacaca’ Courts Finish Work.”18 June 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-18490348 
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confirming or denying the allegations.141 On the other hand, UNHCR lends legitimacy to these 
claims because it registers many asylum seekers each year who are fleeing persecution relating to 
these allegations.  
 The conditions presented above indicate that, not only is Rwanda already an oppressive 
state, but conditions will likely be worse for returning refugees, already assumed guilty before 
innocent, than it is for other Rwandans. These claims are strong enough that refugees can argue 
they continue to fall under the UNHCR’s definition of having “a well-founded fear of 
persecution.” However, the implications of the cessation clause do not end at the repatriation of 
refugees. 
 If my first hypothesis is correct, the UNHCR has made its decisions because of the 
interests and priorities of host governments. The UNHCR’s ability to continue to assist in 
protracted refugee situations is difficult, as more and more refugee situations have become 
protracted despite the fact that donor governments stop putting money towards protracted 
situations often after the first year. By repatriating refugees, the UNHCR has fewer refugees to 
take care of and can decrease costs. While repatriation efforts can be expensive, the cost-benefit 
is generally considered to make repatriation more cost effective. Donors who have lost interest in 
funding a protracted refugee situation may be more interested in helping fund a repatriation. Ms. 
Karen AbuZayd, former Secretary to High Commissioner Ogata (and head of UNRWA) 
explained “People are more excited about repatriation operations… yes funding is easier to get 
for the end of a situation and also what could be a long-standing refugee situation.142”  
 If my second hypothesis is correct, the UNHCR made its decisions based on the priorities 
of host governments. Host governments are heavily motivation to repatriate refugees. For host 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Questions and Answers on UNHCR Comprehensive Strategy on Rwandese Refugee Situation. 
142 AbuZayd, Karen. Interview with, 25 July 2012.  
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countries, refugees often use up land and resources the government may wish to use in other 
ways or for new refugee influxes. For example, in Kyaka II refugee settlement the camp 
commandant saw the repatriation of refugees as crucial to make space for new influxes of 
Congolese refugees.143  
 With little advocacy or money to maintain Rwandan refugees and extensive pressure to 
repatriate Rwandan refugees, a number of external factors have led the UNHCR to invoke the 
cessation clause for Rwandan refugees. While the UNHCR can do nothing more than encourage 
host countries to invoke the cessation clause, few governments choose to keep refugees when 
unnecessary and against the recommendation of the UNHCR, as refugees are often viewed as a 
burden. Because governments are expected to prove that conditions have significantly improved 
in the country of origin, they often leave it to the UNHCR to decide when conditions have 
significantly improved. 
 At the UNHCR’s declaration that they planned to implement the cessation clause, policy 
changes were created that affected the refugees. Information about the cessation was also 
unclear, leading to many policies and actions that negatively affected refugees in ways that both 
directly and indirectly conflict with the UNHCR mandate.  
 While most Rwandan refugees were knowledgeable about the implementation of the 
cessation clause, but most believed the cessation date was 31 December 2011 and were unaware 
that this date had been changed. When asked about their plans and thoughts for the cessation 
clause, several refugees claimed it made them feel sick, unable to sleep or unable to eat. Last 
time there was a voluntary repatriation, many of the refugees did not believe it was going to be 
voluntary and decided to flee the settlement and hide in nearby areas until the repatriation was 
over. According to one Rwandan refugee, many individuals continue to sleep outside of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Kyaka II Camp Commandant. Interview. Kyaka II. 8 November 2011. 
	   88	  
settlement at night because they fear being taken back to Rwanda.144 A few refugees promised to 
commit suicide if forced back to Rwanda. One man exclaimed “I would hide in my house and 
not open my door. I would stay until they shot me with bullets.145”  
 One of the largest misconceptions regarding the cessation by both refugees and officials 
concerns the population affected by the cessation. The Kyaka II Camp Commandant, when asked 
about who the affected population would include, admitted to needing to check his records 
before giving an answer. Only one UNHCR document states specifically what group of Rwandan 
refugees will be affected, stating there would be “cessation of status for Rwandan refugees who 
fled the county as a result of events occurring on or before 31 December 1998.”146 Others only 
allude to the approximate time period and still others use the phrase “Rwandan refugees” without 
qualifying which refugees this includes.  
 To encourage Rwandan refugees to return, the Ugandan government also issued a ban on 
further cultivation of the land. Because of the nature of cultivation, they claimed further 
cultivation would make refugees reluctant to leave when they had the option of profiting off of 
long-term crops such as bananas.147 Many refugees claimed they were told they could not harvest 
the crops they had already planted and that Congolese refugees, upon hearing that Rwandan 
refugees could no longer use their land, took over the land for their own cultivation. Because of 
the way the settlement system is set up, refugees with land for more than five years also no 
longer receive food from the World Food Program, so these refugees were essentially bing 
starved into repatriation, which violates the most basic rights of refugees. The application of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Rwandan refugee, Interview. Kyaka II, Uganda. 10 November 2011. 
145 Rwandan refugee, Interview. Kyaka II, Uganda. 5 November 2011. 
146 Okoth-Obbo, George “Follow up on Implementation of the Roadmap for the Comprehensive Conclusion of 
the Rwandan Refugee Situation, including invocation of the Cessation Clause,” Memorandum, UNHCR, 30 
September 2011. 
147 Protection / Legal Officer, OPM. Interview. Kampala, Uganda. 28 November 2011. 
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land cultivation ban has been implemented for not only those affected by the Cessation clause 
but all Rwandan refugees, violating the rights of more recent asylum seekers with legitimate and 
recognized claims to asylum. When asked about this, the Kyaka II Camp Commandant 
responded that the majority of refugees arrived before 2000.148 Reports have also found that new 
Rwandan asylum seekers have been denied much more frequently since the cessation clause has 
been announced.149 
 It has now been well established that in many ways, the cessation clause both directly and 
indirectly violates the mandate of the UNHCR by endangering the very refugees the UNHCR 
was created to protect by sending them back to an insecure situation where they may be 
endangered, forcing refugees back to Rwanda against their will, failing to educate the Ugandan 
government and the refugees about the implications and applications of the cessation clause and 
thus endangering newer refugees granted direct asylum from the current government, and 
indirectly leading to the denial of food, asylum, and consistent information about their immediate 
future. It is now important to examine the reasons behind the UNHCR’s decision to invoke the 
cessation clause for Rwandan refugees.  
Conclusion 
 In all four cases examined, I have demonstrated through inferential evidence that the 
UNHCR made its decision based on its need to survive as an organization by following at least 
one of the three hypotheses I set forward. The UNHCR encouraged and assisted the repatriation 
of Rwandan refugees from Zaire because they needed to follow the priorities and interests of 
donor governments in order to maintain funding for current and future operations. They co-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Kyaka II Camp Commandant, Interview. Kyaka II, Uganda. 8 November 2011. 
149 International Refugee Rights Initivative, Refugee Law Project, and Social Science Research Council, “A 
Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda.” Citizenship and Displacement in the Great Lakes Region 
Working Paper Number 4, June 2010.  
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organized the massive forced repatriation of refugees with the Tanzanian government because it 
needed to maintain a positive relationship with the Tanzanian government and other host 
governments. They condemned the refoulement of refugees from Uganda instead preventing it or 
participating in it because it needed to uphold its general mission of protecting refugees in order 
to maintain its role as a humanitarian organization. The UNHCR has since recommended the 
cessation of refugee status for Rwandan refugees because both donors and host governments 
have more interest in repatriation and the cessation of refugee status than in the continuation of 
funding and hosting of Rwandan refugees. This leaves the UNHCR in a position of vulnerability 
and risk of donor-fatigue and host-fatigue if it fails to end the protracted refugee situation.  
 This comparative case study demonstrates that the UNHCR’s efforts cannot follow the 
assumptions set forward by humanitarianism, realism, or constructivism. First, it is evident that 
in all of these situations, the UNHCR was not following humanitarianism because it made 
decisions that put refugees in danger. Second, while the UNHCR’s decisions in these events did 
not go against donor priorities, the UNHCR was often motivated first and foremost by other 
factors. This was especially true when donors did not put heavy emphasis on a refugee situation, 
leaving the UNHCR to make its own decisions. The UNHCR’s decisions did not follow 
constructivist theory because, while the UNHCR was able to autonomously make its own 
decisions, these decisions were heavily influenced by the interests and priorities of other actors. 
The UNHCR’s decisions are then, first and foremost, determined by its need to survive as an 
organization.  
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6. Conclusion 
 UNHCR is not likely to change the current date it has set for the cessation clause. Yet 
cessation doesn’t mean the refugees will return to Rwanda.  Instead, many will flee into other 
parts of their host country and live as undocumented immigrants. Nor will cessation’s effects be 
limited to those officially covered by the clause, refugees who fled in or before 1998. It already 
has and will continue to affect those fleeing the oppressive leadership now in power in Rwanda. 
Many have been denied refugee status already. The cessation may not benefit refugees, but it 
will certainly reduce the burden Rwandan refugees are currently putting on host governments, 
donor governments, and the UNHCR itself. As we observe the implementation of the cessation 
clause in the June of 2013, it is important that we understand what led up to it and the 
implications going forward. 
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees makes its decisions based on its 
need to survive as an organization. The framework my theory sets forward for understanding the 
UNHCR’s decisions takes into account the complexities the UNHCR faces when making 
choices. This includes direction from donors it relies on to fund operations, priorities of host 
governments who the UNHCR relies on for permission to operate, and the appearance that it 
adheres to its mission enough that it can maintain its authority as the primary organization in 
charge of refugees. It would be negligent to claim that one of these factors always influences the 
UNHCR more than the others.  
 Liberal theory, or humanitarian applied theory, views the decisions of humanitarian 
organizations as autonomous actions of organizations created through the cooperation of actors 
to create peace and enforce human rights for all individuals. Realist theory, on the contrary, 
believes donor governments make the decisions on what humanitarian organizations, who lack 
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any autonomy, will do. Construcitvisms searches for a middle ground and finds that 
humanitarian organizations are fairly autonomous actors that evolve and change based on 
evolving ideas and knowledge. All three theories fail to take into account the complexities 
involved in the decision-making of humanitarian organizations.  
 As a concluding thought, it is key to speculate about the reasons the UNHCR believes it 
is important to survive. First and foremost, the UNHCR’s survival is important for the reasons 
any organization or company desires to survive. Employees want to keep jobs and the UNHCR 
wants to continue its existence and create a legacy. As is set forward by constructivism, the 
UNHCR has enough autonomy that it is up to the UNHCR itself to make the decisions necessary 
for its own survival. However, it also needs to survive to help its constituents. Indeed, its 
continued existence benefits the groups assumed to benefit within each of the other theories. 
While the UNHCR does not necessarily make its decisions based on what is best for refugees, as 
humanitarian theory sets forward, the UNHCR’s survival guarantees refugees the continued 
existence of an international organization that serves to coordinate resources and protect the 
rights of refugees. Without the UNHCR, the rights of refugees would likely be violated much 
more frequently. Similarly, while the UNHCR does not make all of its decisions based on the 
priorities of donor governments, its survival benefits donor governments because it allows them 
to pool money and resources to advance their priorities through regulation of refugee situations, 
which is important for international stability. Similarly, the UNHCR’s survival helps host 
governments deal with large refugee populations that cross their border pleaing for help. These 
groups continue to support the UNHCR because its survival also benefits them. The UNHCR’s 
makes its decisions in order to ensure these different groups continue to perceive the UNHCR’s 
existence as a benefit to them as well. Therefore, the UNHCR’s survival supersedes all other 
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theories about the UNHCR’s decision-making because it takes into account the complex factors 
involved in UNHCR’s survival and thus its decisions.  
 This study offers a framework for further study. In addressing the UNHCR, I recommend 
that the theories set forward in this paper are applied to a more diverse set of cases. It may be 
possible to code different motivations for a quantitative analysis now that I have established 
specific motivations that should be examined. This theory of organizational survival should also 
be applied to other humanitarian organizations in order to demonstrate the wider application of 
this research.  
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